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ABSTRACT  
In the absence of effective international and federal initiatives to combat 
the impacts of global climate change, many state, local and regional 
jurisdictions are passing or proposing measures to curb carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions.  The province of British Columbia, Canada, as well as 
the cities of San Francisco, California and Boulder, Colorado have carbon 
taxes in place, and similar actions have been proposed in the Oregon and 
Washington state legislatures.  The state of California and the province of 
Québec have linked together in a joint cap-and-trade system. This Article 
will examine the fundaments of carbon taxation, including identification 
of the tax base (the pollutant) and taxpayer (consumer, manufacturer, etc.), 
rates of taxation, measurement standards for tax assessment, exemptions, and 
use of revenue, and then compare them to cap-and-trade systems.  It will 
assess this family of market initiatives based on the following criteria:  (1) 
administerability, (2) political feasibility, (3) revenue generation, (4) efficiency, 
(5) equity, and (6) efficacy.  Lastly, the Article considers the constitutional, 
practical, and political challenges to reform.  The Article concludes that all 
states and provinces in North America should link together in a strict cap-
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and-trade system while local jurisdictions within the region should pass 
broad-based carbon taxes.  Any revenue generated from these market 
mechanisms can be recycled to low-income taxpayers and used for carbon 
sequestration and other “green” purposes.  Although the urgency for binding 
law on a national and international scale is apparent but not immediately 
forthcoming, regional, state and municipal initiatives can serve as blueprints 
for innovative and effective climate policy change.  
INTRODUCTION 
Even though “no serious scientist” would disagree about the fact of 
climate change,1 the countries of the world have been unable to successfully 
address this pressing problem, particularly the world’s richest countries.2 
Despite twenty United Nation summit meetings, no global initiative has 
resulted in any hard-law agreements on greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions.3 
On the U.S. federal level, Congress has passed no cap-and-trade or carbon 
tax legislation.4  A few countries have been successful in their market-based 
initiatives to combat global warming, but most have failed.5 
In the Western North America many promising regional, state and local 
initiatives have been passed or have been proposed.6  At the regional level, 
 
 1.  See Dimitri Zenghelis, Book Review, Science Fact, Climate Fiction—Clarifying the 
Debate, AM. SCIENTIST, May-June 2010, http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/ 
science-fact-climate-fiction-clarifying-the-debate. 
 2.  See Alexander Jung et al., The Warming World: Is Capitalism Destroying Our 
Planet?, DER SPIEGEL (Feb. 25, 2015 6:05 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ 
climage-change-failed-efforts-to-combat-global-warming-a-1020406.html; see also Paul 
Brown, World’s Richest Nationals ‘Failing’ to Address Climate Change, CLIMATE HOME 
(Jan. 15, 2014, 8:34 AM), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2014/01/15/worlds-richest- 
nations-failing-to-address-climate-change. Even Pope Francis has been discussing this 
issue. See Daniel Henninger, Why Can’t the Left Govern, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2014, at 
A15. 
 3.  Justin Worland, What to Know About the Historic ‘Paris Agreement’ on Climate 
Change, TIME (Dec. 12, 2015), http://time.com/4146764/paris-agreement-climate-cop-21/ 
(discussing the fact that emissions targets of individual countries are non-binding). 
 4.  In the absence of mandates, the administration’s efforts have been limited to 
updating EPA standards, climate-related research, and voluntary emission reduction programs 
relating to GHG emissions. See discussion infra Part I.B.  On March 28, 2014, President 
Obama initiated regulations on methane, etc. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CLIMATE 
ACTION PLAN—STRATEGY TO REDUCE METHANE EMISSIONS (Mar. 2014), https://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/strategy_to_reduce_methane_emissions_2014-03- 28_final.pdf. 
 5.  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 6.  See discussion infra Part III. 
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California and Québec have a cap-and-trade system in place7 and the British 
Columbia carbon tax has been effective at reducing carbon emissions with 
only minimal impact on the economy.8  At the state and local level, carbon 
taxes exist in both Boulder and San Francisco and have been proposed in 
Oregon and Washington.  However, much more needs to be done to combat 
climate change.9  In the absence of federal and international action, regional, 
state and local market initiatives can serve as blueprints, giving other 
governments the opportunity to learn from these successful local innovative 
models.10 
Local initiatives11 are important in at least three key respects.  First, many 
of the problems causing climate change stem from local problems.12 Thus, 
 
 7.  See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
 8.  See discussion infra Part III.B.2.a. 
 9.  I guess I would put myself into the “transformative” school of thought when it 
comes to environmental taxation.  I view that environmental harms are “regrettable consequences 
of economic development that can be minimized by different attitudes and concerted 
efforts at environmentally sensitive practices.” David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global 
Warming, 51 CAN. TAX J. 2063, 2070 (2003) (Duff contrasts this transformative view with 
the economic and justice/morality views). According to this transformative view, the 
“main purpose of environmental taxes is not to internalize costs or assign blame for 
environmental harms, but to encourage environmental awareness and shared responsibility 
for creating a better environmental future.” Id. In addition, I believe that our outlook 
should be the “blueprint” model, as opposed to the “scramble model.”  “Blueprint” is an 
optimistic viewpoint, stressing that change can come from the bottom up by focusing on 
local actions that can address environmental challenges. See MCKENZIE FUNK, WINDFALL: 
THE BOOMING BUSINESS OF GLOBAL WARMING ch. 2 (Penguin Press ed., 2014). “Scramble” is 
reactive, where events outpace actions and change only comes when nature forces it. Id. 
Under the “scramble” viewpoint, policy makers pay little attention to the problems. Id. 
 10.  This Article strictly focuses on energy, for local green building initiatives, see 
Nancy E. Shurtz, Eco-Friendly Building from the Ground Up: Environmental Initiatives 
and the Case of Portland, Oregon, 27 J. OF ENVTL. LAW & LITIG. 237, 237–62 (2012). 
 11.  “Local” hereinafter means regional, state, and local. 
 12.  Climate change will affect different places in different ways, so the specific tax 
and other policies used to manage impacts must be tailored to respond to each locality’s 
unique conditions. When local governments create climate change policies, they should 
be evaluated within the context of their specific environments, on a case-by-case basis, 
and should establish a mix of strategies that reflect local priorities and the specific 
vulnerabilities of the community. For example, in areas such as California, which are not 
prone to hurricanes, but are prone to drought and high-traffic congestion, innovative 
transportation policies aimed at mitigating congestion, and GHGs creates by cars, as well 
as policies to fortify and support road infrastructure, should be promoted. See Evan Mills, 
Climate Change, Insurance and the Buildings Sector: Technological Synergisms Between 
Adaptation and Mitigation, 31 BUILDING RES. & INFO. 257, 271 (2003). Alternatively, in 
areas that are prone to frequent hurricanes or typhoons, land use policies that promote 
redevelopment with green buildings, that are often more energy efficient and cost 
effective to begin with, would contribute to a reduction in GHG’s and ultimately reduce 
climate change.  Id. 
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it is within the local jurisdiction’s authority to plan and solve these problems.13 
Second, changing the behavior of people and businesses is often more 
effectively accomplished when done “from the bottom up,”14 and may have 
a cumulative and thus a national (and international) impact.15  Third, in 
the absence of effective federal and international initiatives, state and 
local governments pursuing unique policies can serve as a petri dish for 
the federal government and ultimately the international community by 
offering innovative ideas that can translate into national and international 
initiatives.16 
 
 13.  Gawain Kripke & Brian Dunkiel, Taxing the Environment: Corporate Tax Breaks 
to Promote Environmental Destruction, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Sept. 1998), http://www. 
multinationalmonitor.org/mm1998/98sept/kripke.pdf; BEVERLY I. MORAN, ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: TAXES, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN TAXING AMERICA 
ch. 8 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1997). Moran 
questions “why localities continue to provide incentives, given the tremendous economic 
risks.” Id. at 198. Local initiatives referred to as “corporate welfare” or “perverse 
incentives” are used by local governments to attract new business. The focus of these 
incentives is to promote economic growth. However, the incentives are destructive to the 
environment because they often provide no incentives for the new businesses to pursue 
sustainable practices. To have an effective local climate change initiative, these local 
policies must be eliminated or made contingent upon green initiatives. When local 
governments offer large corporations income and property tax breaks to relocate within 
the city or state, but make no restrictions on the corporation’s environmental activities, 
such unsustainable policies cause a strain on local resources. Thus, local governments 
must steer economic growth and urban development towards GHG reductions when they 
offer corporate welfare packages to new businesses or completely curb this practice. 
 14.  See Gawain Kripke & Brian Dunkiel, supra note 13; see also Beverly I. Moran, 
supra note 13; see also Yair Listokin and David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer 
Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 
179 (2013). Since most people now live in urban areas and even more are expected to 
move there in the future, changing behaviors in just a few city sectors, such as transportation, 
land use, waste, and energy consumption, could make a considerable impact on climate 
change. 
 15.  Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential 
for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669 (2010). 
 16.  See Patricia M. DeChristopher, Flexibility, Efficiency, Integration: Local Lessons in 
Sustainable Development, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157 (2005); Myanna M. 
Dellinger, Localizing Climate Change Action, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 603 (2013); Joe 
Loper, Evaluating Existing State and Local Tax Codes from an ‘Environmental Tax’ 
Perspective: The Case of Energy-Related Taxes, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 61 (1994); Robert B. 
McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local, and 
Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate 
Change, 12 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004); Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, 
The Scale of Networks: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409 (2008) 
(“A growing scholarly and public policy dialogue examines . . . the role of localities in 
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Tax initiatives in particular can provide a price signal that can direct 
investment into new technologies or provide a motivation for people to 
change their behavior.17  Thus, tax initiatives can have a triple-effect on 
curbing climate change.  First, tax deductions and credits in the income 
tax system can incentivize good behavior.18  Second, environmental taxes 
can punish bad behavior.19 Third, the revenue generated from environmental 
taxes can be used to promote environmental practices that can combat 
carbon emissions and climate change.20 New and innovative local tax policies, 
in combination with other initiatives, such as cap-and-trade, should be 
instituted that allow us to move forward in the fight against climate change.21 
Part I of this Article examines International and U.S. federal climate 
change initiatives, as well as those in several Scandinavian and European 
countries.  Part II of this Article compares carbon tax to cap-and-trade and 
assesses these market initiatives based on economic, equitable, and other 
criteria.  Part III explores regional, state and local carbon reduction initiatives 
in the Western North America and urges these types of initiatives be expanded 
throughout the U.S. and Canada.  Part IV makes some general assessments 
and addresses the challenges to reform, such as constitutional, practical, 
and political issues. Lastly, the Article concludes with a call for the federal 
U.S. and international communities to take note of the innovative policies 
that have been implemented in Western North America.  A state/province 
lead multilateral cap-and-trade program expanding throughout North 
America combined with local carbon taxes would be the best way to approach 
 
climate change regulation.  To date, however, analyses of cities’ participation in climate 
policy have largely focused on some combination of law and policy initiatives, urban 
theory, and the intersection of international law with political science.”). 
 17.  See Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 
10 DUKE ENVTL.  L. & POL’Y F. 221, 225 (2000); see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global 
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 677–
800 (1999). 
 18.  Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States: The Long View, 
15 LEWIS & CLARK L.R. 424 (2011) [hereinafter Environmental Taxation in the United 
States]; see also Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Governmental Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 705, 713–38 (1970) (Surrey is of the view that direct subsidies are as good as, if 
not better than, tax subsidies); Charles D. Patterson, III, Environmental Taxes and 
Subsidies: What is the Appropriate Fiscal Policy for Dealing with Modern Environmental 
Problems? 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L & POL’Y REV. 121, 121–59 (2000). 
 19.  Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States, supra note 18. 
 20.  See Stephen Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, 
30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 580, 580–83 (2013); available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/ 
pelr/vol30/iss2/8; Marie Al Kirk & Christian L. Wade, A Taxing Problem for Environmental 
Justice: The Tax Money From Hazardous Waste Facilities, Where It Goes, and What It 
Means, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 201 (1997). 
 21.  See infra notes 289–91 and accompanying text. 
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this problem.22 Such a plan might “nudge” the federal government into passing 
needed legislation, but would at least give a message to the world that it 
is possible to address the problems of climate change.23 
I.  INTERNATIONAL & U.S. FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES 
International and U.S. federal climate change initiatives have proven to 
be inadequate at preventing climate change.  UN Conventions and international 
treaties have failed to stop global warming.  The U.S. has also failed in its 
passage of a carbon tax and cap-and-trade regime.  Very few countries have 
been successful at harnessing market initiative into effective global change 
policy. 
A.  International Climate Change Initiatives Have Failed 
At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the first major international agreement 
on climate change—the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)—was drafted.24 The UNFCCC states as its ultimate 
objective is to achieve25 
Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to 
adapt naturally to climate change, ensure that food production is not threatened, 
and enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
UNFCCC sets forth a framework of guiding principles and includes general 
commitments applicable to all parties.  This framework was significant because 
 
 22.  See WORLD BANK GROUP, States and Trends of Carbon Pricing 22 (May 13, 
2014), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/ 
05/27/00045628620140527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box 
385232.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK] (stating market instruments can “co-exist in harmony 
and complement each other effectively”). 
 23.  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5 (Yale University Press ed., 2008) (describing 
“libertarian paternalism” as a way to try to influence people’s behavior in a direction that 
will benefit them); see also Annabelle Jaeger, Five Reasons Why Local Government Should 
Influence Climate Change Plans, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.the 
guardian.com/public-leaders-network/2015/jan/06/local-government-climate-change-plans. 
 24.  United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change, INC/FCCC 5th 
Sess., 2d Part, at Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II) (May 9, 1992), https://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
 25.  Id. at 4. 
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it represented a solid collaborative commitment from all corners of the 
globe to prevent GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. 
Five years after the original Rio Earth Summit, the first international 
protocol was passed in 1997, at Kyoto, Japan, and entered into force in 
2005.26  The Protocol set forth national emission reduction targets for 
developed nations to meet in two commitment periods between 2008-
2012 and 2013-2020, as well as a flexible mechanism to meet them.27  By 
2009, the Protocol had been adopted by 192 parties.28 However, the United 
States, along with many other nations who signed the Protocol, refused to 
ratify it.29 Canada signed and ratified the Treaty, but withdrew in 2011.30 
In the second commitment period, only 12% of the world’s GHG emissions 
were covered and only 9 countries had ratified the Treaty.31 Russia, Japan, 
and New Zealand, three major carbon emitters, officially pulled out during 
this second commitment period.32 Therefore, while the Kyoto Protocol 
initially seemed like a significant step in the right direction, in recent years 
 
 26.  See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 3 (1998), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter “Protocol” 
or “Kyoto Protocol” or “Treaty”]. The Protocol set forth specific limitations on annual 
GHG emissions.  The limit could be satisfied by reducing GHG emissions, investing in 
carbon “sinks” that remove GHG from the atmosphere, or by acquiring emission reduction 
units from other parties. Id. at 3–9. See also United Nations Framework on Climate Change, 
UN Climate Change Newsroom (1992), http://unfccc.int/index.html; see also United Nations 
Framework on Climate Change, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (2014), http:// 
unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php. 
 27.  The Protocol was amended in 2012 to accommodate the 2013-2020 commitment 
period in what was known as the Doha Amendment of the Kyoto Protocol. However, as 
of August 2015, the Doha Amendment was not yet in force. See International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, August Update on Doha Amendment Ratification, Climate Change 
Policy & Practice. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/august-update-on-doha-
amendment-ratification/; see also United nations Framework Convention of Climate Change, 
Status of the Doha Amendment (Dec. 21, 2015), http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_ 
amendment/items/7362.php (providing interactive map showing ratification of the Doha 
Amendment establishing the Second Commitment Period of the KP.). 
 28.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol (2014), http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/ 
2613.php. 
 29.  See Sewalk, Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade in Favor of Carbon Tax with 
Reinvestment to Reduce Global Emissions, WASH. & LEE J. CLIMATE ENERGY & ENV’T 
355, 364 n.51 (2014) [hereinafter Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade]. 
 30.  Trisolini, supra note 15, at 671; see also David G. Duff, Carbon Taxation in 
British Columbia, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 88 (2008), http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/files/ 
2013/06/Carbon_Taxation_in_British_Columbia.pdf  (“GHG emissions in Canada increased 
substantially throughout the 1990s and early 2000’s; reaching 747 million tons in 2005-
over 25% higher than 1990 level and almost 34% higher than Canada’s commitment under 
the Kyoto Protocol”). 
 31.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 14. 
 32.  Id. at 16. 
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it has been a disappointing failure.  At best, it has resulted in non-binding, 
soft targets from most participants. 
The lack of binding participation on the international level became 
apparent in 2007 at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
when the Panel released its Fourth Assessment Report.33 This report 
indicated that global emissions would need to be reduced by 80-90% or 
more by 2050.34 In the same year, the comprehensive Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change carried out by the U.K. Treasury concluded 
that economic cost of delayed greenhouse gas reductions would be far 
greater than previously projected.35  Yet, in 2009, at the UNFCCC’s 15th 
Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen, a binding agreement 
had still not been created.  The agreement that was created at COP15 in 
2009, the “Copenhagen Accord,” provided a “soft” commitment to keep 
the global temperature increase below two degrees and a scheme to protect 
tropical rainforests known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD).36  While the COP18 in 2013 in Warsaw modified 
REDD (REDD+)37 and focused on “urbanization, and specifically buildings 
and transport, and on the role of local government to enhance global mitigation 
efforts,”38 nothing binding was passed.39 
Yet, despite these efforts, REDD+ has failed.40 In addition, the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification has failed.41  This convention’s 
 
 33.  See Climate Change 2014  Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, (2014), http://ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW, 
XV, 511 (Cambridge University Press ed., 2007). 
 36.  Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord (Dec. 18, 2009), http://unfccc. 
int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. 
 37.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 37, 42. 
 38.  Id. at 37. Although the past climate change initiatives have failed, the 
Mediterranean Action Plan and Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion were a success. See 
Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure, 47 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 195 (2007). 
 39.  See Press Release, United Nations Climate Change Conference in Warsaw 
Keeps Governments on a Track Towards 2015 Climate Agreement (Nov. 23, 2013), 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/13
1123_pr_closing_cop19.pdf. 
 40. Chris Lang, The Dismal Failure of the REDD+ Partnership, REDD MONITOR 
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.redd-monitor.org/2014/11/20/the-dismal-failure-of-the-redd- 
partnership. 
 41.  STEPHEN EMMOTT, TEN BILLION 188 (Vintage Books 2013). 
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“emphasis on a bottom-up approach” to stop land degradation and 
desertification “suggests that a different approach may lead to more 
meaningful results.”42 Recent United Nations data “suggest that fifty 
percent of drylands currently under agricultural cultivation are moderately 
or severely degraded, and 12 million hectares of productive land become 
barren each year due to desertification and drought.”43 Lastly, the Convention 
on Biological Diversity has failed.44  With no compliance mechanism, this 
Convention is very weak and thus fails to stop “monstrous projects.”45  If 
global temperatures rise by more than 3.5°C “70% of the world’s known 
species risk extinction.”46 
The twenty-first Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015, 
made some significant steps in our fight against climate change, but will 
only become legally binding if fifty-five parties to the Agreement sign 
on.47  Over 190 countries “pledged” to hold average global temperatures 
to below 2 degrees Celsius (or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).48 The Agreement 
calls on the countries to report their progress and revisit their targets every 
five years.49 Unfortunately, nonbinding global climate change initiatives 
have failed in the past and may not succeed in the future.50 
 
 42.  Alon Tal & Jessica A. Cohen, Bringing “Top-Down” to “Bottom-Up”: A New 
Role for Environmental Legislation in Combating Desertification, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 163, 215–17 (2007). 
 43.  Selley Weton, Michela Biasutti & Michael B. Gerrard, Legal & Scientific Integrity 
in Advancing a “Land Degradation Neutral World,” 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 40 (2015). 
 44.  EMMOTT, supra note 41, at 188. 
 45.  Rachael Waxler Ruiz, The Convention on Biological Diversity: An Affectation 
of Conservation Exposed by the Interoceanic Chinese-backed Nicaraguan Canal, 28 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 455, 479 (2015); see also Rachelle Adam, Missing the 2010 Biodiversity 
Target: A Wake-up Call for the Convention on Biodiversity?, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 123 (2010). 
 46. Anup Shah, Loss of Biodiversity and Extinctions, GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www. 
globalissues.org/article/171/loss-of-biodiversity-and-extinctions (last updated Jan. 19, 2014). 
 47. Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Proposal by the President (Dec. 11, 2015), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
 48.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 22 (stating an aspiration of “much needed 
international partnerships”); see also 2015 Paris Climate Conference, FRANCE DIPLOMATIE, 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/climate/2015-paris-climate-
conference-cop21 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
 49.  Paris Agreement, supra note 47, at 4. 
 50.  Harris, supra note 38, at 197. (“Despite the Kyoto Protocol entering into force 
in February 2005, the climate regime has been a failure”); see also Press Release, General 
Assembly, Failure to Constrain Climate Change Will Create ‘Climate Chaos’, Secretary-
General Says at High-Level General Assembly Event Aimed at Inspiring Ambitious Accord, 
U.N. Press Release GA/11658 (June 29, 2015). 
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B.  U.S. Federal Climate Change Policies Have Failed 
The U.S. federal government’s climate change policies have been largely 
ineffective at reducing GHG emissions and preventing climate change. In 
the absence of Congressional action mandating a cap-and-trade system or a 
carbon tax, the federal government’s climate change policies have largely 
revolved around new EPA rules and a limited number of tax policies.51  In 
general, the U.S. federal climate change policies have mostly failed. 
Creating an effective climate change policy at the federal level has 
proven difficult for political reasons.52 During the 2008 presidential election, 
president-elect Obama supported the use of a cap-and-trade system to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 made his intention known that 
he wanted the U.S. to become a leader in climate change.53  The cap-and-
trade system that President Obama supported was a federal environmental 
policy that imposed a mandatory cap on omissions while providing flexible 
compliance options.54  The program aimed to reward innovation, efficiency, 
and early action without inhibiting economic growth.55  Once elected, President 
Obama issued Executive Order 13514 on Oct. 5, 2009, requiring federal 
 
 51.  Thomas M. Gremillion, Setting the Foundation: Climate Change Adaptation at 
the Local Level, 41 ENVTL. L. 1221, n.189 (2011) (citing Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting 
Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 
59 EMORY L.J. 1, 26 (2009)); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: 
A Collective Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1163 (2010) 
(“Despite the critical need for the development of adaptive response to climate change, the 
federal government has done little to stake out its turf on adaptation policy or to coordinate 
the response of lower levels of government”); and see J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation 
and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 412 (2010) 
(“The United States has compiled close to zero in the way of coordinated anticipatory 
adaptation policy for managing the risk in the United States of climate change catastrophe 
and crisis”). 
 52.  Many prominent Republicans do not even believe in global warming or climate 
change or do not believe it is an immediate threat. Ashley Parker, Day After Fed Uproar, 
Perry Tones It Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/us/ 
politics/18perry.html. 
 53.  Robert N. Stavins, Obama’s Speech on a U.S. Cap-and-Trade System and Global 
Climate Negotiations, BELFER CENTER (Nov. 20, 2008), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/ 
publication/18682/obamas_speech_on_a_us_capandtrade_system_and_global_climate_
negotiations.html. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Cap and Trade, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/captrade (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
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agencies to undertake various measures to reduce GHG emissions56 and 
to identify climate change strategies in conjunction with the interagency 
Climate Change Adaptation Task Force.57 As of the writing of this Article 
however, most agencies have only made promises.58 Some have argued 
that federal policy failed to encourage coordination with state and local 
authorities while others even argued federal policy inhibited best practices 
of local jurisdictions.59  However, what is clear is that the policy got 
bogged down in the political doldrums and was never successfully fully 
implemented. 
An equally exciting, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt by a U.S. federal 
agency to control climate change came from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  NOAA had proposed a reorganization 
to create a national Climate Service, centralizing federal sources of 
information on climate change strategies.60  Congressional Republicans, 
unfortunately, have targeted NOAA’s revenue-neutral reorganization in 
recent spending bills and cut off funding to the Climate Service.61 
With the current failure of the Republican Congress to pass climate 
change legislation, the Obama administration’s efforts have been focused 
on the EPA’s initiative to treat greenhouse gas emissions as pollution 
under the Clean Air Act.62  The EPA recently set forth clean energy guidelines 
(the Clean Power Plan or CPP) for fuel-fired electric plants.63  The CPP 
 
 56.  Exec. Order No. 13514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 5, 2009) (revoked by Exec. 
Order No. 13693, 80 Fed. Reg. 15,871 (Mar. 19, 2015)). Pursuant to the Executive Order, 
all federal agencies were required by June 2011 to issue an agency-wide climate change 
adaptation policy statement, which commits the agency to adaptation planning to address 
challenges posed by climate change risks to the agency’s mission, programs, and operations. 
Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan, June 2014, 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/2014-DOT-Strategic-Sustainability- 
Performance-Plan.pdf. 
 59.  Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance in Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 26 (2009); Glicksman, supra 
note 51, at 26; Ruhl, supra note 51, at 412. 
 60.  Emily Yehle, Appropriations: House Votes to Slash Climate Research, Block 
New Red Snapper Fishing Plan, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC, June 4, 2015, http://wwweenews.net/ 
stories/106001948; see also Examining NOAA’s Climate Service Proposal: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 112th Cong. 1–3 (2011) (statement of Dr. Jane Lubchenco, 
Administrator, NOAA). 
 61.  Press Release. H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., Republicans Raise Concerns with 
NOAA Climate Service, EPA Science Activities (Mar. 10, 2011), https://science.house.gov/ 
news/press-releases/republicans-raise-concerns-noaa-climate-service-epa-science-activities. 
 62.  The Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(d)(2014). 
 63.  Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants#additional- 
resources (last visited Dec. 24, 2015). 
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requires each state to submit an implementation plan for EPA approval by 
June 16, 2016 and authorizes the states to use market-based programs to 
meet emission targets.64  Issues surrounding whether the CPP is within the 
scope of EPA authority has been tied up in litigation.65  The Supreme Court 
is expected to hear the case in 2018 or 2019.66  Unfortunately, the regulatory 
approach is often slow, complex and inefficient. 
In the federal tax law area, environmental taxes and income tax incentives 
have largely failed to combat climate change.67 Very few environmental 
initiatives exist; and, the ones that do have a very small effect on climate 
change.68  Environmental taxes are imposed on crude oil and petroleum 
products (oil spill liability), the sale or use of ozone-depleting chemicals 
(ODCs), imported products containing or manufactured with ODCs,69 and 
gas guzzling cars.70  These taxes are antiquated, too narrowly tailored, and 
as a result, are ineffective in combatting climate change.71  Tax incentives 
have often subsidized bad environmental activities, such as oil and gas 
exploration, with minimal benefits for renewable energy and conservation.72 
 
 64.  See Craig Gannett, Implementing Section 111(D) of the Clean Air Act: The 
Pathway to Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. FOUND. 8–3 
(Jan. 2015) (noting the allowance of “market-based trading programs”). 
 65.  Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. 
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 66.  Gannett, supra note 64, at 9–10 (“To make matters more complicated, the current 
demographics of the Court suggest that the outcome of this case may turn on the 2016 
Presidential election”). 
 67.  Roberta F. Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1135, 1135–1222 (2002). 
 68.  See Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States: Retrospective and 
Prospective, in GREEN TAXATION IN EAST ASIA 113 (Richard Cullen et al. eds., 2011). 
 69.  Environmental Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/publications/ 
p510/ch03.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2015). 
 70.  See Milne, supra note 68, at 122 (Milne explains that the Gas Guzzler Tax has 
been largely ineffective because of the exception for non-passenger vehicles like SUVs 
and the tax rates have not been increased since 1990); see also Gas Guzzler Tax, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 4064 (2005); and see 40 C.F.R. § 600.306-86 (2011). 
 71.  See Yoram Margalioth, Tax Policy Analysis of Climate Change, 64 TAX L. REV. 
63, 63–98 (2010). 
 72.   Mona L. Hymel, The Population Crisis: The Stork, The Plow, and the IRS, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 13, 18 (1998); see also Ajay Gupta, Does the Tax Code Favor Fossil Fuels?, 
149 TAX NOTES 331 (2015) (“President Obama has annually called for eliminating a dozen 
or so tax preferences supposedly subsidizing fossil fuel production.  According to the 
administration’s fiscal 2016 budget, retaining those items would cost an aggregate of $49.7 
billion in forgone revenue over 10 years.”  Gupta goes on to enumerate the following tax 
provision the administration wants to eliminate or reduce: (1) Section 263(a) (expensing 
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Some successes have been made in wind and solar energy.73 However, 
much more reform is needed.  Federal tax policy should incentivize clean 
and renewable energy, preserve and protect carbon sinks, promote efficient 
and clean-fuel vehicles, subsidize energy-efficient buildings and appliances, 
and reduce methane and other harmful GHG gas emissions. See summary 
Chart I below for reform suggestions. 
CHART I: ENVIRONMENTAL TAX INCENTIVES 
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of intangible drilling expenses); (2) Section 616(a) (expensing of development costs for 
mine or other natural deposits other than oil or gas well); (3) Section 617(a) (deduction for 
mining exploration costs); (4) Section 193 (qualified tertiary injectant expenses); (5) 
Section 174 (expensing of research and development costs); (6) Section 613 and 613A 
(percentage depletion); and (7) Section 199 (domestic manufacturing deduction for oil and 
natural gas)); but see John A. Bogdanski, Reflections on the Environmental Impacts of 
Federal Tax Subsidies for Oil, Gas, and Timber Production, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
323, 332–33 (2011). 
 73.  RUSSELL H. PLANTE, SOLAR ENERGY PHOTOVOLTAICS AND DOMESTIC HOT 
WATER 116 (1 ed. 2014); CRAIG M. KLINE, SOLAR IN THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: 
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 391, 394 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011); Eric Stoutenburg, 
Combining Offshore Wind and Wave Farms to Facilitate Grid Integration of Variable 
Renewables, STANFORD WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV’T (Apr. 23, 2012, 4:15-5:15 PM), 
http://energyseminar.stanford.edu/node/429. 
 74. Richard Westin, What to Do With Proceeds of a Carbon Tax?, 115 TAX NOTES 
191–93 (2007); Shi-Ling Hsu, Reducing Emissions From the Electricity Generation Industry: 
Can We Finally Do It?, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 427 (2001). 
 75.  Roberta Mann, Another Day Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives 
Encourage Burning Coal and the Consequences for Global Warming, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE 
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 111 (2007). 
 76.  Mona L. Hymel, Environmental Tax Policy in the United States: A “Bit” of History, 
3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 162 (2013). 
 77.  Katarina Olivia Savino, The Case of Nuclear Power Incentives, 123 TAX NOTES 
329, 331 (2009). 
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 78.  See generally Janet E. Milne, Timber Taxes: A Critique of the Northern Forest Lands 
Council’s Tax Recommendations, 19 VT. L. REV. 423 (1995); LARRY KREISER ET AL., 
ENVTL. TAXATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ACHIEVING ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY THROUGH 
FISCAL POLICY 150, 151 (Larry Kreiser et al. eds., 10th ed. 2011); Mann, supra note 67. 
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 79.  Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience With Energy-Based Tax Incentives: 
The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 
53, 67 (2006). 
 80.  Britt Anne Bernheim, Can We Cure Our Throwaway Habits by Imposing the True 
Social Cost on Disposable Products?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 953, 966 (1992). 
 81.  Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. 
TAX REV. 347, 349 (2000). 
 82.  Hymel, The Population Crisis, supra note 72, at 76, 86. 
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 83.  See generally Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives 
Transportation Choice, 24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 595 (2005). 
 84.  Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of Home 
Ownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 158–87 (2005); Roberta F. Mann, The 
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(Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1347–97 (2000).  
 85.  Hymel, supra note 72, at 48, 55. 
 86.  See Duff, supra note 9, at 2107–09. 
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The main reason for the environmental climate change conundrum in 
America is political.87 Therefore, like the failed attempts to prevent 
climate change on the international level, a large-scale solution to 
climate change at the U.S. federal level is unlikely in the near future.88 
Therefore, from a federal policymaking standpoint, the U.S. federal 
government’s promises to reduce climate change have followed the 
global climate change trend—with a bunch of hot air. 
C.  A Few Countries Have Had Successes But Most Have Failed 
Some Scandinavian and European countries have passed effective carbon 
taxes, usually in combination with other forms of energy and pollution 
taxation and tax subsidies.89  In addition, many of these countries are also 
part of the regional emissions trading system (the EU ETS), thus demonstrating 
that a country can utilize both of these carbon pricing mechanisms.90 Some 
countries, like Australia, have passed carbon taxes and then repealed them.91  
Other countries have proposed carbon taxes, but never passed them.92  
Most countries of the world, however, have never even contemplated a 
carbon tax.93 
 
 87.  A majority of the population thinks the economy, not the environment, is the 
most important problem the country faces today. See Most Important Problem, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
 88.  See Roberta F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics 
and Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10118, 10119 (2009) 
(stating that “it appears inevitable that Congress will enact some sort of federal climate 
change legislation in the next few years”). 
 89.  CARBON TAX CTR., Where Carbon is Taxed, http://www.carbontax.org/ progress/ 
where-carbon-is-taxed (last updated Apr. 6, 2016); see also Duff, Tax Policy and Global 
Warming, supra note 9, at 2092, 2094 (mentioning how Scandinavian countries use a 
combination of tax and subsidy approaches and pointing out the fertilizer tax in Sweden).  
Denmark also has a sulfur tax. See infra note 112. 
 90.  Denmark, Finland, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands 
Portugal, Sweden, and the UK are part of the EU. See EU Member Countries, EUROPEAN 
UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/index_en.htm (last visited 
Dec. 26, 2015). 
 91.  For countries that have enacted a carbon tax, see CARBON TAX CTR., supra note 
89. 
 92.  For countries that have proposed a carbon tax, see CARBON TAX CTR., supra 
note 89. 
 93.  See EUROPEAN ENV’T AGENCY, Progress Towards 2008–2012 Kyoto Target in 
Europe (2014), http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/progress-towards-2008-2012-kyoto# 
tab-news-and-articles. 
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1.  The Scandinavian Success Stories 
The Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway 
have been the pioneers in carbon taxation. Perhaps the most successful 
country has been Sweden, followed by Denmark and Finland.  In contrast, 
Norway’s carbon tax has been largely ineffective at reducing GHG emissions.  
The lessons learned here are that the effectiveness of the carbon tax depends 
on a number of factors, such as the scope of the tax, its rate, exemptions, 
and where the revenue from the tax goes. 
The Swedish carbon tax, passed in 1991, has the highest rate of all 
countries in the world.94  Like most successful carbon tax initiatives the 
initial rates were to increase over time.95 As of 2014, the rate was equivalent 
to US $168/tCO2.96 The tax is broad based in its scope, covering all fossil 
fuels used for heating and all motor fuels for transport—about 25% of the 
GHG emissions in the country.97 To enhance business competitiveness 
and support economic efficiency, the tax is higher on households and the 
service sector98and lower in sectors subject to international competition.99 
The tax is compatible with EU ETS as fossil fuels regulated there are fully 
exempt and even non-ETS industry and agriculture are partially exempt.100 
Instead of directly providing exemptions to all GHG emissions covered 
under the EU Cap-and-Trade system, exemptions gradually increased over 
time.101 Administrative costs have been low, less than 0.1% of the revenue 
collected,102 and revenue from the tax has been steady from 1993 to 2000 
 
 94.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 17 (stating that the rates range from the high in 
Sweden to the low in Mexico of US $1/tCO2e). 
 95.  Jacqueline Cottrell, Green Budget Economy, United Nations Environment 
Programme on Carbon Taxes: Fiscal Policies Towards an Inclusive Green Economy (Oct. 
8, 2012), Exhibit 3, http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/research_ 
products/Fiscal%20Policies/2_Cottrell_CarbonTax_IMF_UNEP_GIZ_2012_FINAL.pdf. 
 96.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 17. 
 97.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 82. 
 98.  Cottrell, supra note 95, at 3 (stating that levels of taxation increased from €27 
in 1991 to €114 in 2011); Mikael Skou Andersen, Europe’s Experience with Carbon-
Energy Taxation, 3 S.A.P.I.EN.S 6–7 (2010), http://sapiens.revues.org/1072#text (The 
“large increase in household electricity taxes depressed real incomes in the short run”). 
 99.  Cottrell, supra note 95, at 3 (showing low levels at €7 in 1991 and €34 outside 
EU, zero within EU ETS, 2011); see also WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 82. 
 100.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 82. 
 101.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 82. (For example, “District heating plants 
participating in the EU ETS and heat from EU ETS plants are not used for manufacturing 
purposes now have to pay 80% of the tax rate compared to 94% before 2014.”) 
 102.  Cottrell, supra note 95, at 3. 
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and then increased to $3.65 billion annually in 2005-2007.103  Sweden directs 
the revenues to the general budget.104 In other words, Sweden has mainly 
recycled the revenues to lower income taxes, specifically the tax on labor.105 
Swedish studies have indicated that GHG emissions fell about 15% between 
1995 and 1990 and have fallen by more than 40% since the mid-1970s.106  
At the same time, between 1990 and 2007, the Swedish economy has grown 
over 20%.107 Interestingly, all political parties were willing to implement 
this tax.108 A key ingredient of a successful tax is political leadership and 
population acceptance. 
Denmark is “one of the carbon tax proponents’ favorite case studies.”109 
Passed in 1991, the carbon tax “was part of a larger environmental tax 
package, which included energy taxes,” a sulfur tax, and subsidies for 
wind and energy efficiency.110  The tax was broad-based covering all 
consumption of fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, coal and electricity) and thus 
approximately 45% of the total GHG emissions in the country.111  Designed 
to minimally impact industry, the rates varied depending on energy use 
and phased-in over time.112 Tax rates increased each year between 2008 
and 2015 and now stand at US $31/tCO2 equivalence.113 Like Sweden, 
industries subject to the EU ETS are generally exempt, however fuels for 
the production of district heating are subject to the tax even though covered 
 
 103.  Jenny Summer et al., Carbon Taxes: A Review of Experience and Policy Design 
Considerations, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab, NREL/TP-6A2-47312, at 11 (2009), http://www. 
nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47312.pdf. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Andersen, supra note 98, at sec. 2.2 (“It would have been difficult for [Sweden 
and Finland] to follow the recommendations from the fiscal literature to aim reductions at 
employers’ social security contributions, because such contributions are relatively small 
in both countries”). 
 106.  Summer et al., supra note 103, at 12; see also Sierra Rayne, The Devil and the 
Details of National Carbon Tax Experiments, AMERICAN THINKER (Feb. 21, 2015), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2015/02/the_devil_and_the_details_of_national_c
arbon_tax_experiments.html (“From 1991 to 3003, emissions declined just 0.9 percent.  
Since 2003, emissions have declined 19 percent and there has been only 19 percent real 
economic growth during this decade. . .”). 
 107.  Summer et al., supra note 103, at 12; but see Cottrell, supra note 95, at Exhibit 
4 (stating that GDP has gone from $100 billion to $143 billion). However, the consumer 
price index has also increased. See Andersen, supra note 98, at sec. 2.3 (“The Swedish 
experience suggests that combining carbon-energy taxes on households with reductions in 
income taxes could cause inflation rates at a level triggering a possible tax interaction 
effect, but further analysis is required to corroborate this”). 
 108.  Cottrell, supra note 95, at 3. 
 109.  Rayne, supra note 106. 
 110.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 84–85; see also Rayne, supra note 106. 
 111.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 79. 
 112.  Id. (demonstrating how when the carbon tax passed, the tax on energy was reduced 
to maintain an overall even tax rate). 
 113.  Id. 
SHURTZ(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  10:31 AM 
[VOL. 7:  61, 2015–16]  Carbon Pricing Initiatives 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 83 
in the cap-and-trade.114  Energy-intensive sectors not in the cap-and-trade are 
given exemptions similar to free allowance in the EU ETS,115 and up until 
2014, these sectors could negotiate voluntary agreements to be exempt 
if covered under the EU ETS.116  In 2008, the revenue from the Danish carbon 
tax was $905 million.117 40% of that revenue is used for environmental 
subsidies while the other 60% is returned to industry.118 Studies showed 
that Denmark’s industrial emissions “decreased by 23% during the 1990s, 
after adjusting for growth and market-induced industry restructuring.”119 
However, unlike Sweden, the Danish economy has “contracted  in real 
terms by 3 percent since 2006.”120 
Finland was the first country to adopt a carbon tax in 1990.121  This tax 
was broad-based and imposed on gasoline, diesel, light fuel and heavy 
fuel oil, jet fuel, aviation gasoline, coal natural gas and electricity.122 The 
tax covers all consumers of fossil fuels, except for fuels for electricity 
production, commercial aviation and commercial yachting.123 Its scope 
was limited to covering only 15% of the total GHG emissions in the 
country.124 Like Sweden and Finland, the rates varied on type of fuel and 
gradually increased over time.125 In 2013, the liquid traffic fuel rate was 
US $83/tCO2, whereas the rate for heating fuels increased to US $48 from 
$41.126 Like Sweden, all revenues from the tax went directly to the general 
budget without any earmarking. By lowering income taxes on labor, the 
impact on lower-income taxpayers was made more equitable.127 In 2000, 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. (“From 2013 incineration plants are included in the EU ETS and thus also 
doubly regulated.”) 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Cindy Bae, Denmark’s Carbon Tax Policy, THE UNIV. OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BLOG 
(Feb. 7, 2013), http://blogs.ubc.ca/cindybae/2013/02/07/denmarks-carbon-tax-policy. 
 118.  Summer et al., supra note 103, at 13. 
 119.  Cf.  Rayne, supra note 106, at 1 (“[B]etween 1992 and 2006, there was absolutely 
no reduction in Denmark’s carbon dioxide emissions—actually, there was a slight increase. 
Since 2006, there has been a large decrease in emissions (by about one-third)”). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Summer et al., supra note 103, at 9. 
 122.  Id. (“Coal is subject to a tax of $73.97 per metric ton, natural gas is subject to a 
reduced tax rate of $3.02 per MWh, and liquid fuels are taxed between $-.07 and $0.09 
per liter.” (citing European Environmental Agency). 
 123.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 79. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Andersen, supra note 98, at 6. 
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the Finnish government determined that the tax resulted in a reduction of 
roughly 4 million metric tons of CO2 (or 7% of emissions) between 1990 
and 1998.128  Between 2007 and 2012 emissions declined 23 percent.129 On 
the other hand, unlike Sweden, the Finnish national economy “shrunk 
almost 4 percent in real terms.”130 
Like Sweden and Denmark, Norway passed a carbon tax in 1991.131  
The taxed sectors include gasoline, light and heavy fuel oil, and oil and 
gas in the North Sea. Certain industries pay a reduced rate (pulp and paper, 
fishmeal, domestic aviation, domestic shipping and continental shelf fleet) 
while some industries (foreign shipping, fishing, and external aviation) 
are exempt.132 Industry “included in the EU ETS are (partially) exempted 
from the carbon tax, except for the offshore petroleum industry.133 The tax 
covered 50% of the GHG emissions in the country.134 Like its sister states 
of Finland and Sweden, revenue from the tax goes into the general 
government budget.135 However, the funds were to be used to finance a 
special pension fund.136 Unfortunately, studies have shown that GHG 
emissions have increased by 15% from the time the tax was first 
implemented.137  Thus, the Norway carbon tax has mostly failed. 
 
 
 128.  Summer et al., supra note 103, at 9. 
 129.  Rayne, supra note 106. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 10, 81. 
 132.  Id. at 10. 
 133.  Id. at 80. 
 134.  Id. at 81. 
 135.  Summer et al., supra note 103, at 10. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. Norway also experienced an increase in GDP of 70% since 1990 and that is 
the excuse used to explain the failure of the carbon tax. See Sumner et. al., supra note 103, 
at 10. 
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2.  Other Countries Carbon Taxes 
Several European countries have also passed carbon taxes: France,138 
Iceland,139 Ireland,140 Italy,141 Netherlands,142 Portugal,143 Switzerland,144 
and the United Kingdom.145  (See Appendix A)  Under these systems, price 
signals vary, ranging from low tax rates of $10t/CO2 in Iceland to $68t/
CO2 in Switzerland. The taxes are generally broad-based. UK’s tax covers 
approximately 25% of GHF emissions,146 whereas Iceland’s covers 50%.147 
Exemptions, or partial exemptions, are given for firms included in the EU 
ETS.  The use and amount of the revenue collected from the tax have also 
varied.  In the United Kingdom the tax was intended to be revenue neutral 
with offsetting cuts to the National Insurance Contributions, but ended up 
being revenue negative.148  In contrast, the Netherlands tax revenues were 
 
 138.  See generally Dominique Bureau, The Political Economy of the 2009 French 
Carbon Tax Project, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(2012), http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/The%20Political%20Economy%20of%20 
the%202009%20French%20Carbon%20Tax%20project.pdf. 
 139.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 10. 
 140.  See id. at 80.  In 2010, Ireland passed a carbon tax on emissions from fossil fuels, 
including kerosene, diesel fuel, liquid petroleum, fuel oil and natural gas. See JENNY H. 
LIU & JEFF RENFRO, CARBON TAX AND SHIFT: HOW TO MAKE IT WORK FOR OREGON’S 
ECONOMY 9 (2013), http://www.pdx.edu/nerc/carbontax2013.pdf. In 2013, the tax was 
expanded to solid fuels such as peat and coal. Id. The tax only applies to sectors not part 
of the EU ETS. Id. The tax slowly phased in at higher amounts. Id. The tax is estimated to 
generate 500 million pounds of revenue in 2013 and potentially offset the Irish income 
tax. Id. Ireland’s Environmental Protection Agency estimates that overall GHG emissions 
dropped 6.7% and energy GHG emissions dropped by 10.5%. Id. This was all done with 
slight growth in the Irish economy. Id. 
 141.  See Svetlana Kovalyova, Italy to Introduce Carbon Tax to Fund Green Energy, 
REUTERS, Apr. 17, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/17/italy-carbontax-idUSL6 
E8FHALR20120417. 
 142.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22. 
 143.  See Putting a Price on Carbon with a Tax, WORLD BANK 1, 3 [hereinafter WORLD 
BANK 2], http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbak/document/Climate/background- 
notex_carbon-tax.pdf. 
 144.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 83. 
 147.  Id. at 80. 
 148.  The United Kingdom passed a limited carbon tax in 2001. Summer et al., supra 
note 103, at 13, 14. The tax covered electricity, natural gas supplied by gas utilities, 
liquefied gas supplied in a liquid state for heating, and solid fuel, such as coal and coke, 
lignite. Id. at 13. The sectors covered include industrial, commercial, agricultural, public 
and service sectors and the rates vary depending on the sector. Id. Residential sectors were 
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substantial—over $4.819 billion and the revenues are used to shift the tax 
burden off individuals and business as well as recycle a portion for the 
purchase of environmental equipment.149  More often the revenue goes 
into the general fund and is used to shift taxes off individuals and businesses.  
As far as effectiveness, the taxes vary, as does the impact on the country’s 
economy.150 (See Chart 4 in Appendix B). 
Only a few countries outside Europe have passed carbon taxes.  For 
example, South Africa and Kazakhstan have a carbon tax.151 The countries 
in South America are just starting to implement carbon taxes.152  Both 
Chile and Brazil have proposed a carbon tax.153 Australia passed a carbon 
tax in 2012 and then repealed it in 2014.154 African countries and Middle 
Eastern countries including Russia have not enacted any such taxes.155  
Asian countries have generally preferred cap-and-trade, although the Republic 
of Korea has a carbon tax.156 (See Appendix A) 
3.  The EU ETS Has Failed 
In 2005, the EU implemented the EU Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) encompassing 27 countries.157  The EU ETS program covered the electric 
power sector and the major energy-intensive industrial sector.158 Many of 
 
excluded. Id. A study estimated that the tax would reduce energy demand my 15%. Id. at 
14. 
 149.  Id. at 9. The Netherlands passed a carbon tax in 1990. Id. at 1. The tax is broad-
based, covering natural gas, electricity, blast furnaces, coke ovens, refinery and coal gas, 
coal gasification gas, gasoline, diesel, and light fuel. Id. at 9. The Netherlands Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment estimated that the tax would be effective 
in reducing annual emissions by 5%. Id. 
 150.  Rayne, supra note 106, at 1, 2. 
 151.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 83. 
 152.  Costa Rica passed a carbon tax in 1997, but has provided no data since 2005. 
See Rayne, supra note 106, at 1. 
 153.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 84. 
 154.  The price was $23 per ton of carbon emissions and this was “extraordinarily 
high by international standards and [it] lacked the phased-in approach of other programs 
such as the EU ETS or the British Columbia carbon tax.” Michael Wara, Instrument 
Choice, Carbon Emissions, and Information, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 261, 299 
(2015). When the conservative party won the election, the tax was repealed. Id. Since it 
was enacted by a simple majority of the parliament, repeal was easy with the election 
changes. Id. This did not operate as a fixed price tax, it “was not actually a carbon tax.” 
Id. 
 155.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 78, 83. 
 156.  Id. at 62–68, 84. 
 157.  Id. at 70; Rachel Cleetus, We Need a Well-Designed Cap-and-Trade Program 
to Fight Global Warming, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 2009), http://www. 
ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/capandtradeback
grounder.pdf. 
 158.  Cleetus, supra note 157. 
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the Scandinavian and European countries discussed above are part of the 
EU, so in addition to their state carbon taxes, their carbon emitters are subject 
to a cap-and-trade regime.159  Usually these industries are exempt or partially 
exempt from the carbon tax, which could present an issue of effectiveness 
because the EU ETS had been ineffective.160 
The EU ETS has been criticized on several grounds.  First, the cap was 
set at a too high level and thus was too generous for polluters.  In fact, no 
reduction of emissions occurred because the price of allowances collapsed.161  
Second, the allowances were not auctioned but grandfathered to existing 
industries.162 The EU ETS ended up distributing 95% of the allowances 
for free.163 Thus, the EU failed to meet its goals under the Kyoto Protocol.164 
Several other jurisdictions outside the EU have passed cap-and-trade 
systems. Switzerland, New Zealand, Japan, and Kazakhstan have a cap-
and-trade, as does Alberta and Québec in Canada.165  The U.S. has the 
California (CA) Cap-and-Trade and the Northeastern Regional one.166 A 
growing number of countries are considering cap-and-trade, more so than 
carbon taxes.167 When added to carbon taxes, about “40 countries and over 
 
 159.  For a list of the European Union member countries, see Member countries of 
the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2015). 
 160.  For Sweden, see supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text; for Denmark, see 
supra notes 109–20 and accompanying text, for Norway, see supra note 131–37 and 
accompanying text. 
 161.  See Sewalk, Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade, supra note 29, at 374 (“Phase I 
of the EU-ETS implementation saw another issue with an over-allocation of allowances 
causing the price of those allowances to fall again…. During Phase II , the price for 
allowances plummeted further, diminishing the incentive polluters had to reduce their 
GHG emissions.”). 
 162.  Andrew J. O’Connell, A Critical Analysis of Allowance Allocation in Cap-and-
Trade and Its Effect on Linked Carbon Markets, 44 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 360–61 (2014). 
In the first two periods allowances were grandfathered but in the later period they were 
auctioned and benchmarked. Id. 
 163.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: 
Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 41 (2009). 
 164.  Id. at 42; see also EUROPEAN ENVTL. AGENCY, TECHNICAL REP., supra note 93. 
 165.  Duff, supra note 9, at 90. 
 166.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 167.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 5; see Ann E. Carlson, Designing 
Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 207, 207 (2012) (stating that the cap-and-trade system is “the dominant policy choice” 
to date); cf. Haifeng Deng, Improving the Legal Implementation Mechanisms for A Carbon 
Tax in China, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 665, 684 (2015) (stating that carbon trading is a 
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20 sub-national jurisdictions are putting a price on carbon” and together 
these carbon pricing instruments cover around “12% of the annual global 
GHG emissions.”168 Of course, this is not enough and more needs to be 
done.169 
II.  CARBON TAXES VS. CAP-AND-TRADE 
A heated battle currently is being fought as to whether a cap-and-trade 
or a carbon tax will be better to solve our climate change problem. Many 
commentators and authors of law reviews have advocated that a cap-and-
trade is better,170 whereas many others have argued that a carbon tax is 
best.171  My thesis is that both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade should be 
used on the local and regional level, particularly for Canada and the U.S., 
two of the largest contributors to climate change and two of the biggest 
beneficiaries of climate change.172 If designed properly, these market 
mechanisms can work together and be effective.173 
A.  A Heated Debate 
Most economists prefer carbon taxes. According to most economists, 
price instruments, such as carbon taxes, can be expected to be more efficient 
and effective than quantity instruments, such as tradable allowances.174  
 
more natural regulation of the market economy than a carbon tax); available at http:// 
digital commons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/2. 
 168.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 14. 
 169.  Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20, 
at 580–82, 609. 
 170.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 6–7; Carlson, supra note 167, at 208 
n.8; Alex Rice Kerr, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, 34 ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 69, 92, 97 
(2010); Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax, supra note 88; Joshua Meltzer, A Carbon 
Tax As a Driver of Green Technology Innovation and the Implications for International 
Trade, 35 ENERGY L.J. 45, 67 (2014); Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps 
Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20, at 602–09; Wara, supra note 154, at 284. 
 171.  See LARRY KREISER ET AL., supra note 78, at 41–42; see also David P. Warren 
& Scott Tomashefsky, The Western Climate Initiative, 41 STATE & LOCAL GOV’T REV. 55 
(2009), available at http://slg.sagepub.com/content/41/1/55.full.pdf+html; see also Melinda 
Harm Benson, Regional Initiatives: Scaling the Climate Response and Responding to 
Conceptions of Scale, 100 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 1025, 1025–35 
(2010). 
 172.  See discussion infra Part II.B. But see Carlson, supra note 167, at 226–47, for 
a discussion of complementary policies as unnecessary in conjunction with a cap-and-
trade program absent market failure.  
 173.  See infra Part IV. 
 174.  For example, former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, Nobel laureate Joseph 
Stiglitz, and Republican economist N. Gregory Mankiw all are in favor of a carbon tax. 
Deborah Solomon, Climate Change’s Great Divide, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2007, 12:01 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118955082446224332. David Driesen notes that 
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Economists favor taxes because “they provide the clearest price signal, 
unencumbered by factors like baselines, allowance allocation, and use of 
credits.”175  Price instruments are thought to perform better under uncertainty, 
to raise valuable revenues and to avoid transaction costs.176 Economists 
say a viable market for tradable pollution rights can rarely exist unless the 
government makes the right decision and clears all market barriers to free 
trade.177  Furthermore, tradable allowances may lead to environmental hot 
spots in low-income communities and diminish the pressure on emitting 
companies to make technological changes to restrict GHG emissions.178 
On the other hand, most environmentalist and politicians favor cap-and-
trade.179  Environmentalists want a certain cap on emissions to assure 
environmental benefits.180 Politicians hate taxes and have even signed 
 
cap-and-trade can stifle innovation and result in concentrated local pollution. Parisa Smith, 
Can the Success of Carbon Emission Cap-and-Trade Market be Predicted Based on the 
EPA’s Acid Rain Program, 6 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 57, 70 (2011-2012) 
(construing David Driesen, Linkage and Multilevel Governance, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 389, 409 (2009)). 
 175.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 34 n.120 (quoting N. Gregory Mankiw, 
One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2007), http://www. nytimes. 
com/2007/09/16/business/16view.html?_r=0). 
 176.  Id. at 40–43. 
 177.  Richard Posner, Should There be a Carbon Emissions Tax? BECKNER-POSNER 
BLOG (July 7, 2013), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/should-there-be-a-carbon- 
emissions-tax-posner.html. 
 178.  Industry groups can essentially lobby to continue to pollute. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, 
supra note 163, at 44. The cap-and-trade framework sends an “ambiguous message” 
that government allows you to pollute as long as you pay, essentially signaling that “it a 
purchase price for a right to pollute”, in contrast to “a carbon [tax that] sends a clear 
signal.” Id. 
 179.  John Dingell, Democrat from Michigan and powerful chair of the Energy and 
Commerce Committee, is one of the few politicians that favors carbon taxes. Kimberley 
Strassel, Some Inconvenient Truths, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2007, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj. 
com/articles/SB119162838307050834 (stating it is “easy . . . to rig a [Cap-and-Trade] system. 
Europe has shown that this is hell to make work. They’re going back to the drawing board 
again, with no assurance they won’t make the same mistakes they did before.”). 
 180.  See generally Yale Sch. of Forestry & Envtl. Stud., Putting a Price on Carbon: 
An Emissions Cap or a Tax?, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 7, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/ 
putting_a_price_on_carbon_an_emissions_cap_or_a_tax/2148 (“From an environmental 
point of view, the advantage of an emissions cap over a carbon tax is clear: A cap puts a 
legal limit on pollution.”). 
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pledges not to raise them.181  Furthermore, cap-and-trade systems allow 
politicians to allocate original allowances to favored constituents.182 
Business groups can go either way.  Businesses usually like a certain 
price so they can accurately determine their profit and calculate whether 
they can pass on the increased cost to their consumers.183  Cost certainty 
“enables business to plan ahead, secure in the knowledge that raising the 
tax rate beyond any automatic adjustment, which can be planned for, 
requires another vote” in the legislature.184 Nonpolluting companies might 
support a carbon tax if they do not pollute and the revenues from the tax 
will reduce their corporate tax.185 Of course, if the exiting industry can be 
grandfathered into the cap-and-trade without paying for the initial allowance, 
they would favor the cap-and-trade.186  In addition, business groups that 
can sharply reduce their emissions will prefer cap-and-trade as they can 
profit from selling their excess allowances to others.187 Lastly, Wall Street 
would also most likely support cap-and-trade as “hefty fees” can be charged 
“for arranging trades in allowances and futures trading.”188 
B.  A Comparison 
Both the carbon tax and the cap-and-trade are market-based mechanisms 
so both can encourage cost-effective technological innovation.189 Both can be 
superior to the regulatory approach, which specifically mandates emissions, 
 
 181.  Most politicians like cap-and-trade because it is a hidden tax but is not called a 
tax. See Strassel, supra note 179. Most Republicans have signed onto the Norquist Pledge. 
See Paul Waldman, Nearly All the GOP Candidates Bow Down to Grover Norquist, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/08/13/ 
nearly-all-the-gop-candidates-bow-down-to-grover-norquist. 
 182.  See Yale Sch. of Forestry & Envtl. Stud., supra note 180 (comment by Roger 
A. Pielke, Jr. stating that a cap-and-trade is doomed to failure). 
 183.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 46; see also Mann, The Case for the 
Carbon Tax, supra note 88, at 10122, 10125. 
 184.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 42. 
 185.  See Wara, supra note 154, at 297 (explaining that Walmart may support high 
carbon tax if carbon tax will reduce its corporate income tax: “Wal-Mart, once it has 
received the benefit of a reduction in tax liability, will be loath to return to a higher rate so 
that American Electric Power can face a lower carbon tax liability.”); see also AviYonah 
& Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 46. 
 186.   See Mann, supra note 88, at 10120–21. (“[F]ree allowances ease the transition 
for exiting emitters, but could raise the cost of reducing carbon emissions.  They also have 
the anomalous result of rewarding exiting emitters with valuable allowances. This allocation 
forms the main ‘winner-picking’ mechanism in cap-and trade.”). 
 187.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 46. 
 188.  Id.; see also Wara, supra note 154, at 289. 
 189.  See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 
CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 95 (2001). 
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tends to be complicated, and is slow to be fully implemented.190  In addition, 
these mechanisms can be better than tax incentives for renewable energy 
as they “incentivize efficiency improvements, reduction in energy use, and 
fuel switching from higher-to-lower emissions fuels.”191 Since greenhouse gas 
emissions occur throughout the world, a market-based instrument, such as 
cap-and-trade, when linked with other countries, could prove the best 
approach to solve the climate change problem.192  Nevertheless, both of these 
market mechanisms can work together and be administered, politically 
feasible, revenue generating, efficient, equitable, and effective. 
1.  Administerability 
Whether a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system is adopted at the regional 
or national level, the administerability issues are similar.  Thus, both can 
be effectively designed with a broad base, a low cap/or high tax, and few 
exemptions. Both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes can be imposed 
“upstream” or “downstream.” Upstream measures usually hit emissions 
from fossil fuel production (oil, coal and natural gas), such as refineries and 
power plants.193 Such a system could be effective because it would ensure 
that all sources of carbon dioxide at the point entering the economy are 
covered and would impact fewer entities than downstream.194  The 
upstream approach also reduces complexity because it covers large sources.  
Downstream would work better locally as it hits consumption, such as 
motor vehicle drivers, electricity users, and arguably all sectors of the 
economy emitting heat.195 However, this might impact political feasibility 
as it more directly affects the consumer.196  In addition, the broader range 
 
 190.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 28–29 (explaining the “inherent 
complexity of the Clean Air Act and the delays that would face any regulatory system to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed, if past experience under the Clean Air Act is any 
guide, litigation would ensue once a new regulatory regime was established leading to 
even greater delays in carbon dioxide reductions.”). 
 191.  Claudia O’Brien et al., Implementing Carbon Taxes: Considerations, Realities, 
and Lessons Learned, ENERGY & CLIMATE REP., May 6, 2013, at 6. 
These mandates and market initiatives often beat out voluntary agreements, all of these 
mechanisms have a place. See generally Stewart, supra note 189. 
 192.  See Wiener, supra note 17, at 692. 
 193.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 31. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  See Janet E. Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States: The Context for the Future, 
10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 13–14 (2008) [hereinafter Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States]. 
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of sources could make administration more complex, because of the necessity 
to increase the monitoring. 
In general, a cap-and-trade tends to be more administratively complex.197  
First, a baseline must be set to establish an emissions cap and this might 
be inaccurate.198 If this is set too high, than the system will be ineffective 
in reducing carbon emissions.  If the cap is set too low, the costs to the 
emitters will be too high and make carbon allowances more expensive on 
the market.  Once a cap is set, a mechanism must be instituted to determine 
how allowances will be created and distributed.  Free allowances will benefit 
the current industries or polluters and no money will be raised.  In the 
alternative, a charge can be made for the allowance or the allowance can 
be auctioned off.199  Third, the trading in allowances must be established, 
creating a market for purchases and sales.  Fourth, monitoring of the trading 
must occur, to prevent fraud and punish violators.200 Fifth, to prevent cost 
uncertainty banking and borrowing need to be established.  Banking will 
allow a holder to save its allowances for use in the future.201  Borrowing 
allows the holder to emit now and pay back later by emitting less.202 
However, these very mechanisms can prevent the desired certainty of 
benefit. Sixth, offsets must be established for carbon sequestration. Offsets 
allow the emitter to invest in forest conservation and other projects that 
absorb carbon.203  Finally, to be internationally effective, the cap-and-trade 
program needs to be coordinated with other cap-and-trade regimes and 
carbon tax systems.204 Often, it is difficult, both politically and design-wise, 
to coordinate with other systems.205 
For a carbon tax, one must decide whether to tax upstream or downstream, 
then set a tax rate, decide on any exemptions or credits, and monitor. Unlike 
 
 197.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 37–38. 
 198.  Wara, supra note 154, at 261 (arguing that the U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide 
emissions DOE energy model is “biased and imprecise to such a degree as to make its use 
impractical”). 
 199.  See Mann, supra note 88, at 10120. 
 200.  Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20, at 
605 (“Control must be stringent so that the same allowance cannot be used more than once.”); 
see also Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 39 ([A]n elaborate mechanism would 
need to be set up to distribute and collect allowances and to ensure that allowances are 
real and that polluters are penalized if they emit greenhouses [sic] gases without an 
allowance.”). 
 201.  Managing Allowance Prices in a Cap-and-Trade Program, CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE at vii (Nov. 2010), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress- 
2009-2010/reports/11-04-2010-cap-and-trade.pdf; Mann, supra note 88, at 10121. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Mann, supra note 88, at 10121 (discussing problems of accurate measurement 
of these offsets giving the example of a tropical forest in Brazil). 
 204.  O’Connell, supra note 162; Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 38–39. 
 205.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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cap-and-trade, carbon taxes can be enforced by existing revenue departments. 
Thus, carbon taxes are generally simpler than the cap-and-trade regime, 
but do not work as well on the international level. 
CHART 2.  COMPARISON OF CAP-AND-TRADE AND CARBON TAX 
CAP-AND-TRADE CARBON TAX 
Upstream/downstream 
Set level of emissions 
Determine quantity of allowances 
Determine allocation of allowances 
(free/fee/auction) 
Create a market  
Monitor emissions  
Monitor market 
Banking, borrowing, credits and 
offsets 
Upstream/downstream 





Cap-and-trade programs take a long time to get passed and implemented,206 
whereas, a carbon tax can be enacted and enforced practically overnight.207 
Most cap-and-trade bills are long and complicated, whereas carbon tax 
 
 206.  If Waxman-Markley Cap-and-Trade passed then we would be “stuck with a 
situation in which relatively little abatement was occurring, allowance price were very 
low, and the prospect of report . . . was a remote possibility. By contrast, passage of a 
carbon tax with prices similar to those envisioned by all parties for the allowances under 
Waxman-Markey, would have led to much greater abatement than anticipated and few, or 
at any rate likely unsuccessful, calls for weakening of the pollution pricing scheme. Given 
the bias and variance in emission forecasts, and the sensitivity of outcomes under cap-and-
trade to these projections, carbon taxes offer a much greater likelihood that all sides in a 
climate regulation negotiation enjoy the benefit of the bargain.”  See Wara, supra note 
154, at 300. Designing real cap-and-trade programs may require information that 
regulators currently do not possess and are unlikely to ever possess.  Id. at 265.  Given 
weakness in forecast models, likely cap-and-trade not achieve the objectives that 
environmentalists want. Id. at 301.  At least two examples: CA RECLAIM and CA Bill 
32. Id. at 293–95. “[E]vidence exists that cap-and-trade programs are vulnerable to 
weakening in the face of higher than expected allowance prices.” Id. at 295. 
 207.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 39.  “A new administration determined 
to implement cap and trade would probably have to take at least two years to get the [cap-
and-trade] program passed in Congress and set up for implementation.” 
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proposals are shorter and simpler.208  The longer the text the more likely 
it will not be understood—and the greater possibly of loopholes.209 
Allowances under cap-and-trade raise interesting securities, tax, and 
international trade issues.210  Securities issues arise with the regulation of 
futures trading in allowances.211  Tax issues arise when allowances are 
free, upon trading and selling of allowances, and when banking borrowing 
and offsets are involved.212  World Trade Organization compliance issues 
also arise with cap-and-trade.213 Carbon taxes, on the other hand, do not 
raise securities or tax issues and do not pose international trade problem 
because they can be collected on imports and rebated on exports and not 
imposed on domestic production.214 
2.  Political Feasibility 
At the local level, just as at the federal level, differences arise between 
the traditional values of Republicans and Democrats.  In general, Republicans 
are reluctant to pass a tax, so a cap-and-and trade regime is probably more 
politically feasible.215  The public might also not like a tax, although 
a cap-and-trade will also result in higher gas and electric bills.  In general, 
polls have shown that citizens have a “strong public resistance to new 
 
 208. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 38 “A carbon tax is inherently 
simple: a tax is imposed at X dollars per ton of carbon content on the main sources of 
carbon dioxide emissions in the economy.” 
 209.  See Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 
20, at 604. 
 210.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 38–39. 
 211.  See id. at 40. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. at 49. 
 214.  Id.; see also Keith Kendall, Carbon Taxes and the WTO: A Carbon Charge 
Without Trade Concerns?, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 50, 87 (2012) (“Under [a border 
tax adjustment (BTA)], exports have the tax rebated, so they enter the world market free 
of the carbon charge, with imports being subjected to the same impost as domestically 
produced goods.  In this way, the domestic policy has a neutral effect on a domestic 
industry’s international competitiveness…. The major hurdle for a carbon tax to be 
legitimate under the WTO is its uncertain status as an indirect tax—that is, as a tax on a 
produce rather than on the producer (or the PPB). There are strong arguments in both 
directions, making this the major hurdle in terms of introducing an economically appropriate 
carbon tax.  There is strong potential, though, that even if a carbon tax BTA were found 
to violate the substantive provisions of the WTO, it may qualify for one of the exceptions 
under Article XX.”). 
 215.  See Chris Good, Norquist’s Tax Pledge: What It Is and How It Started, ABCNEWS 
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/11/norquists-tax-pledge-what-it- 
is-and-how-it-started/. 
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taxes.”216 Since a tax is more transparent, it is more likely to have citizen 
complaints.217 For example, a July 2014 poll showed that taxpayers in 
California would not support the cap-and-trade if their gas and electric 
bills would go up.218 On the other hand, the British Columbia carbon tax 
has had sustained popularity even with the recession and several 
administrations.219 
It is possible that a cap-and-trade may be more politically acceptable 
because the U.S. has already experienced a very successful permit system 
under the Acid Rain Program, implemented under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990.220  This program offered a successful model in the 
trading system of sulfur-dioxide and nitrogen oxide—pollutants that cause 
acid rain and smog.221 This success at the federal level could translate into 
a more politically feasible regional cap-and-trade system.222 
A cap-and-trade is probably more consistent with pre-existing government 
environmental regulations.223 The new EPA rules under the CPP specifically 
cover “market-based trading programs.”224  Although nothing in the plan 
mentions carbon taxes,225 EPA officials have mentioned that local carbon 
taxes would be acceptable.226  However, cap-and-trade can “more easily 
 
 216.  See Keibun Mori, Washington State Carbon Tax, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF COMMERCE 
1, 13 (2011), http://www.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/Washington-State-Carbon-Tax.pdf 
(A disadvantage of carbon taxes is “the strong public resistance to new taxes”). 
 217.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at n.151. 
 218.  Madhu Ravi, Making Sense of California’s Cap-and-Trade System, CAL. COMMON 
SENSE (May 4, 2015), http://cacs.org/researc/californias-cap-and-trade-and-what-will-influence- 
its-future/. 
 219.  For example, the “British Columbia carbon tax was introduced by the province’s 
finance minister at the time, Carole Taylor, and was considered alongside other revenue 
measures, including changes in numerous other taxes.” Wara, supra note 154, at 297, 300. 
The status quo, once established, is very difficult to alter.  Id. 
 220.  Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2584 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651 (1990)). 
 221.  Id. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 34 (the program “focused on 111 
facilities in the Midwest (the so-called “Big Dirties”)). 
 222.  We Need a Well-Designed Cap-and-Trade Program to Fight Global Warming, 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2009) [hereinafter CONCERNED SCIENTISTS], http://www. 
ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/capandtradeback
grounder.pdf. 
 223.  Claudia O’Brien et al., supra note 191, at 5, n.56. 
 224.  Gannett, supra note 64, at 8-3, n.15. 
 225.  See Clean Air Act, supra note 62. 
 226.  Coral Davenport & Peter Baker, Taking Page from Health Care Act, Obama 
Climate Plan Relies on States, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2014, at A16; see also infra note 482,  
at 34,832–33. 
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dovetail with similar existing and proposed regimes” in other regions. 227  
Thus, cap-and-trade can be regionally connected.  Commentators have favored 
cap-and-trade for a similar reason in the international realm.228 
There is also a difference in political economy between a cap-and-trade 
and a carbon tax.  The legislative, administrative, and budgetary considerations 
for a tax can be quite different.  Taxes are passed in the legislature by a finance, 
not an energy or environment committee, and are administered by the 
department of revenue.229  In addition, different requirements exist for how 
the funds are distributed.230  These differences were illustrated by the recent 
cases challenging the CA Cap-and-Trade regime.231 In August 2013, the 
courts held the cap-and-trade system was a fee and not a tax.232 As the 
court said, a tax has to be passed by supermajority of the California state 
legislature, a voting requirement in the state constitution.233  Fees only 
need a majority in the state agency authorized in the statute.234  Here, the 
state’s landmark carbon dioxide legislation of 2006 was passed by a simple 
majority and granted power to the Air Resources Board (ARB), a branch of 
the California Environmental Protection Agency, to establish the cap-and-
trade regime.235 The court also points out another difference—revenue from 
taxes can be spent on anything, such as rebates to the poor, whereas a fee 
must go into programs closely aligned with the fee itself.236  Because the 
purpose of the CA Cap-and-Trade is to reduce GHG, the fees from the 
auctions of the permits must go into the Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Fund.237 Thus, California has struggled to make the cap-and-trade system 
equitable.238 
This political difference between a tax and a fee could be significant for 
the states in the western United States.  Oregon, like California, has a similar 
 
 227.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 38–39. 
 228.  See Wiener, supra note 17. 
 229.  See Surrey, supra note 18, at 728–30. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Alan Durning & Yoram Bauman, 17 Things to Know About California’s Carbon 
Cap, SIGHTLINE INST. (May 22, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.sightline.org/2014/05/22/17-
things-to-know-about-californias-carbon-cap/. 
 232.  Cal. Chamber of Commerce et al. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd. et al., No. 34-2012-
80001313 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2013), Joint ruling with Morning Star Packing Co. et 
al. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd. et al., No. 34-2013-80001464 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/html/decision_111413.pdf. 
 233.  Durning & Bauman, supra note 231. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. (“AB 32 passed by a simple majority in 2006”). 
 236.  Durning & Bauman, supra note 231. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  The state got the utilities to give a rebate and have designated a 25% percentage 
of the revenues to “disadvantaged communities.” Id. Solar panels on public buildings, etc. 
could result, as well as mass transportation systems that could benefit the poor. Id. 
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supermajority rule for new revenue measures.239  However, Washington 
does not have such a requirement.240  Therefore, Washington has tremendous 
flexibility in what carbon mechanism to choose.  Furthermore, if they join 
the CA Cap-and-Trade system, they can use the revenues to reduce the 
regressive effects of the Cap-and-Trade system or in any manner they so 
desire. 
3.  Revenue Generation 
Both carbon tax and cap-and-trade can generate revenue—in money 
from selling permits and with funds raised from carbon taxes.  However, 
if the initial permits are given away and not auctioned, then no money will 
be generated.  A carbon tax, however, will always result in revenue.241 
Most states have to balance their budget so any new revenue could be 
desirable from the state’s viewpoint.242  However, the use of the revenue 
can determine the impact on efficacy, economic growth and equity. To 
accomplish efficacy, the revenues should go to fund research into low-
emission technologies or recycled into green practices,243 or to mass transit, 
research and development, carbon sequestration, and other greenhouse-
gas reducing efforts.244  To promote economic growth, economists often 
favor a reduction in capital taxes or reduction in deficits.245 To ensure 
equity, the money should be used to “shift the tax” burden off labor or 
sales taxes, lessen the tax on small businesses and low-income taxpayers, 
or used for lump sum rebates or refundable credits to poor households.246 
In the alternative, the revenue could be used for multiple purposes. 
Many of the state economic studies have run models using various 
percentages for reinvestment into green practices and into a tax shift off 
the poor.247  They conclude that there will be no serious impact on the 
 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20, 
at 607. For example, a $10 per ton carbon tax should generate $50 billion. Id. 
 242.  Every state but Vermont has to balance its budget. 
 243.  Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20, 
at 614 (stating the revenue could go to “building a new energy economy” and the creation 
of “new jobs”). 
 244.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 41. 
 245.  See infra note 259 and accomanying text. 
 246.  See Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States, supra note 196, at 8; see also Milne, 
Environmental Taxes in the United States, supra note 18, at 439. 
 247.  See, e.g., Liu & Renfro, supra note 140. 
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economy with minimal reinvestment of the funds into green initiatives.248  
The studies show that the greater the reinvestment the more adverse the 
impact on the economy but the more environmentally effective the mechanism; 
whereas, a greater percentage going to a tax shift would be more equitable.249 
4.  Efficiency or Economic Growth 
One of the biggest issues with a carbon tax is the impact on business 
and industry.  The companies that will suffer the most from a carbon fee 
or tax are those in cement, chemicals, car manufacturing, iron and steel, 
aluminum, mining and oil.250 If the cost of doing business goes up for these 
industries, they could move to other jurisdictions.  This so-called “leakage” 
can have an adverse impact on the economy and employment of the state 
or region.251 However, to eliminate this negative economic effect, the carbon 
systems can exempt industries (allocate free permits to them) and/or use the 
revenue to reduce their taxes. 
The rate of the carbon tax or the cap set on the cap-and-trade will impact 
the criteria of efficiency or economic growth. In general, the higher the 
rate of carbon tax or lower the emissions cap, the more adverse impact on 
the economy. For example, the Congressional Budget Office estimates 
that in order to decrease CO2 levels by 20% below 1990 levels, a $250 per 
ton tax would be needed.252  However, if even a $50 per metric ton tax is 
imposed, estimates are that U.S. gross national product will decline by as 
much as $146 billion.253 With a moderate carbon tax of $20 or $30, economic 
studies in several European Countries, British Columbia, and Oregon have 
all shown no significant adverse impact on the economy.254 
Where the revenue from the carbon tax or cap-and-trade is directed or 
earmarked will also impact the criteria of efficiency or economic growth. 
One study concluded that using pollution tax revenues to lower other 
 
 248.  Id. at 12. 
 249.  Id. at 6. 
 250.  Mark J. Perry, Carbon Tax Would Kill Major Industries, Hurt U.S. Consumers, 
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY (Oct. 16, 2012), http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials-on=the-
right/101612-629540-carbon-tax-would-kill-off-growth-in-american-eoncomy.htm. 
 251.  Claudia O’Brien et al., supra note 191, at 5. 
 252.  David Kreutzer, The Impacts of Carbon Taxes on the U.S. Economy, U.S. 
SENATE FIN. COMM., 3 (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
Testimony%20-%20David%20Kreutzer.pdf. 
 253.  Id. at 11–12. (discussing the costs of the Climate Security Act of 2013, which 
would impose a $50 per-metric-ton tax by 2030. Kruetzer estimates that such a tax would 
impose a cost of $146 billion to the US economy in the year 2030 alone). 
 254.  See Liu & Renfro, supra note 140; but see Kreutzer, supra note 252, at 4. 
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distortionary tax burdens can even improve economic performance,255 and 
no decline in GNP would result.256  A study by the Economic Policy 
Institute even concluded that over 2 million jobs could be created over the 
next twenty years with a fifty percent reduction in U.S. carbon emissions 
under alternative market approaches.257  Other economic studies258 have 
shown that the most economically efficient use of the tax revenue would 
be to cut taxes on capital, followed by reducing payroll taxes259 and that 
recycling the revenues with lump-sum rebates to lower-income households 
would have the worst economic efficiency outcomes.260 
5.  Equity or Incidence 
The incidence, and thus the equity, of the carbon tax or cap-and-trade 
will also depend on how much revenue is generated and how the revenue 
is used.261 Both mechanisms will increase the energy costs to consumers 
 
 255.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 41; see also Jared Carbone et al., Getting 
to an Efficient Carbon Tax: How the Revenue is Used Matters, RES. FOR THE FUTURE 35 
(Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Resources-
185_Feature-Carbone.etal.pdf; and Charles Komanoff, Carbon Tax Polling Milestone: 2/3 
Support if Revenue Neutral, CARBON TAX CTR. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.carbontax. 
org/blogarchives/2015/04/15/carbon-tax-polling-milestone-23-support-if-revenue-neutral; but 
see Oren Cass, Carbon Taxes in Revenue Fantasyland, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2015), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/carbon-taxes-in-revenue-fantasyland-1430436869. 
 256.  Carbone et al., supra note 255, at 35. 
 257.  Bill Dougherty et al., Clean Energy and Jobs, ECON. POLICY INST. 2 (Feb. 2002), 
http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/studies/cleanenergyandjobs.pdf. 
 258.  Dale W. Jorgenson et al., Carbon Taxes and Fiscal Reform in the United States, 
68 NAT’L TAX J. 121 (2015); Warwick J. McKibbin et al., Carbon Taxes and U.S. Fiscal 
Reform, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 139 (2015); Sebastian Rausch & John Reilly, Carbon Taxes, 
Deficits and Energy Policy Interactions, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 157 (2015); Sugandha D. 
Tuladhar et al., Environmental Policy for Fiscal Reform: Can a Carbon Tax Play a Role?, 
68 NAT’L TAX J. 179 (2015); Roberton C. Williams III et al., The Initial  Incidence of a 
Carbon Tax Across Income Groups, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 195 (2015). 
 259.  Williams, supra note 258, at 198; see also Sebastian Rausch & John Reilly, Carbon 
Taxes, Deficits and Energy Policy Interactions, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 157 (2015). 
 260.  Williams, supra note 258, at 198. A lump sum transfer or a cut in sales tax would 
benefit older generations at the cost of younger generations, whereas a cut in labor taxes 
would have the opposite effect. Id. 
 261.  Id. at 210; SEBASTIAN RAUSCH, ET AL., MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE 
AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF A U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
POLICY: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF CARBON PRICING, (Nov. 2009), http:// 
globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt182.pdf.  National carbon taxes may 
have uneven regional impacts due to vastly differing energy structures and energy consumption 
patterns from region to region. See infra note 265.  The Northeast opposes taxes because 
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and thus could have some inequitable impacts on lower-income taxpayers.  
An American Enterprise Institute paper estimates that a tax of $15 per ton 
of carbon dioxide emitted would increase the cost of a gallon of gas by 24 
cents and the price of coal-fired electricity by $1.63 per kilowatt-hour.262  
The Congressional Budget office estimates a 15% cut in emissions would 
cost the poorest households an additional $677 a year in current dollars.263 
Other studies264  also demonstrate that low-income households spend greater 
percentage of their income on energy and that the distribution of the tax 
revenues from a carbon tax can make the tax less regressive.265  If the consumer 
can substitute public transportation for driving then the carbon mechanism 
will have less of an adverse impact.  However, electricity tends to be inelastic 
and could have a larger impact on the consumer.266 At least a carbon tax 
guarantees revenue that can be used to alleviate the burden on the poor, 
whereas there is no such guarantee when the cap-and-trade constitutes a 
fee. 
6.  Efficacy 
Regional or local cap-and-trade initiatives alone will not be enough to 
solve the climate change problem. Scientists say that emissions of greenhouse 
gasses must be cut by at least 60% to stabilize global warming.267 Limiting 
the average global temperature rise to less than 2°C “is commonly regarded 
as a prerequisite to avoid dangerous climate change.”268 The investment 
needed, however, in the energy sector alone, to accomplish this objective 
 
they could increase the price of heating oil.  Id. The West dislikes increase in gasoline taxes 
because of greater than average driving distances. Id. The Corn-belt states are sensitive to 
diesel fuel price increases due to agricultural use. Id. The Midwest and Southeast are 
energy-producing and oppose any form of energy taxes. Id.  In addition, the Midwest uses 
electricity generated primarily by coal-fired power plants. Id. 
  262.  Aparna Mathur & Adele Morris, Distributional Effects of a Carbon Tax in Broader 
US Fiscal Reform, AM. ENTER. INST. 18 (Dec. 14, 2012), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/12/-mathur-distributional-effects-of-a-carbon-tax-in-broader-us-fiscal-
reform_17161031273.pdf. 
 263.  Kevin Brady, Editorial, Who Pays for Cap and Trade?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2009), 
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/wsj-who-pays-for-cap-and-trade/. 
 264.  Id.; Bill Dougherty et al., supra note 257. 
 265.  Dallas Burtraw et al., The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Where You Stand 
Depends on Where You Sit, RES. FOR THE FUTURE (Sept. 2008), http://www.mistra.org/ 
download/18.3a618cec141021343374fa7/1379435883778/Burtraw%2Bet%2Bal%2B200
8%2Ba.pdf; see also Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra 
note 20, at 607 n.175. 
 266.  Andersen, supra note 98, at 8. 
 267.  See Harris, supra note 38, at 197 n.8 (citing WORLD RESOURCES INST., The Difficulty 
of Stabilizing Emissions, World Resources: The Urban Environment (1996–97), http:// 
population.wri.org/pubs_content_text.cfm?ContentID=792). 
 268.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 22. 
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is “estimated to be US $910 billion per annum during 2010-2050.”269  
Obviously, state and local governments are not prepared to make that kind 
of investment. In addition, tax rates would have to be prohibitively high 
and the caps prohibitively low to get these emissions under control.270 
In terms of efficacy, the key difference between a carbon tax and a cap-
and-trade is that a cap-and-trade places a cap on emissions so there is what 
is called “benefit certainty,” whereas carbon taxes set an exact price on 
emissions or a cap on the costs of abatement, so there is “cost certainty.”271  
The benefit certainty of the cap, however, is not an advantage if the cap is 
not set accurately.272  This is the “Achilles heel” of the cap-and-trade system.273  
Once the price is set, it may not be effective, as the market (such as low gas 
prices) might depress the price.274  Furthermore, changing the cap might be 
difficult–unless of course, it is somehow phased-in incrementally over the 
years in the initial legislation. 
The only way to prevent cost uncertainty in a cap-and-trade is to have 
safety value mechanisms.  If the market price allowances become too high, 
businesses can receive or purchase at a fixed price additional allowance at 
a set price from the government.275 If the cap amount “begins to seriously 
hurt business and the price allowances spikes,” the cap can be lowered.276  
These mechanisms, however, frustrate the efficacy or benefit of the cap-
and-trade. 
Similarly, a carbon tax cannot guarantee a certain benefit, it can just set 
a price. Again, the tax rate may not be effective to impact behavior.277 If 
the tax is set too low, it will not cause a reduction in carbon consumption 
 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  See Kevin Brady, supra note 263; Andersen, supra note 98. 
 271.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 35–37. 
 272.  See supra pp. 72–85. 
 273.  Rita Chandiok, Climate Change Law in California and Massachusetts: Lessons 
for State Policymakers, 21 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 249, 284 (2015) (referring 
to the measuring of the additionality of carbon emissions). 
 274.  Dingell says the cap-and-trade system alone does not convey the real cost of 
climate change and that companies would be allowed under cap-and-trade to spew a certain 
amount of carbon dioxide into the air. See Strassel, supra note 179. 
 275.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 43 (“The fundamental problem is that 
the reduction in the cap that is built into the cap and trade would necessarily make allowances 
more expensive.  How much more expensive depends on the development of future 
technologies, which cannot be predicted with an accuracy over the longer time period (fifty 
years or more) required for a cap and trade program to achieve its environmental goals.”). 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. 
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and if the tax is set too high, it may have adverse equity or economic 
repercussions.278 Like cap-and-trade, the rates can be increased over time 
with a phase-in.  Arguably, the tax could be set to accomplish the benefit 
desired.279 However, exemptions can also make the tax ineffective, and 
credits can be given to carbon sequestration projects and other projects 
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but dilute the price signal.280  In the 
end, carbon taxes, like cap-and-trade, leave environmental outcomes 
uncertain.281 
Even if the revenues from the tax or cap-and-trade program go back and 
are 100% reinvested in lower-carbon alternatives, such as renewable 
energy, or into energy efficiency, “the efficacy of those projects is similarly 
uncertain.”282  And any revenue used in this way would not be available to 
mitigate the regressive impacts of such policies.283 In the end, there is no 
authoritative evidence that putting a price on carbon (either through a carbon 
tax or a cap-and-trade regime) by themselves will effectively reduce 
emissions.284 
C.  Conclusion 
Both carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems can be designed to be 
effective.285 Both can have strict cost-containment mechanisms:  setting 
a stringent cap, including all economic sources of emissions, covering all 
heat-trapping gas emission, and excluding loopholes.286 Allowances can 
 
 278.  Claudia O’Brien et al., supra note 191, at 4. 
 279.  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 32–33 (“If the carbon tax did not 
produce the desired reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, the tax would be increased; if 
the tax “overcorrected” and produced greater than anticipated reductions, it could be 
decreased.”). 
 280.  Kenneth Johnson, Beware of the Dogmatist: A consensus perspective on the 
Tax-versus-Cap debate (Working Paper Series 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstact 
=1154638 (“[The] price stability [of a carbon tax] could theoretically be five times more 
cost-efficient than cap-and-trade.”). 
 281.  Claudia O’Brien et al., supra note 191, at 4. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20, 
at 609 (“[B]oth carbon tax and cap-and-trade bills have failed to give proof of any real 
emission reductions. . . . There is no firm data to show that putting a price on carbon will 
reduce emissions. The EU-ETS has created a carbon market, but the successes are 
economical rather than environmental.”). 
 285.  The effectiveness of MMs depends on: the number of regulated sources, the 
physical and chemical nature of a regulated pollutant, the range of technology option  
available, the existence of cost-effective monitoring, reporting and verification systems, 
adaptive decision-making process, etc. See CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 222. 
 286.  These would include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. See id. at 2. 
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be auctioned off and revenue used for the public good. Although emissions 
have been reduced by these market mechanism, they have not been reduced 
enough.287 A cap-and-trade program is thus alone “not sufficient to meet 
the challenges of climate change.”288 Therefore, we need local carbon 
taxes in addition to regional level cap-and-trade, but other policies are also 
needed. We should require utilities to provide a greater percentage of their 
electricity from renewable energy sources, require automakers and producers 
of appliances to increase performance standards, and mandate stronger 
energy efficiency for new and existing buildings.289  In addition, policies 
should be established to create positive tax incentives for good behavior.  
We should promote conservation, encourage smart growth, and provide 
incentives for investment in low-carbon or renewable technologies.290  
Lastly, we need to eliminate the bad policies, such as the removal of fossil 
fuel subsidies, at the federal level and the perverse corporate welfare 
subsidies at the local level.291  A comprehensive approach is what is needed 
to solve our climate change crisis. 
III.  WESTERN NORTH AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES 
Because of the failure of binding climate change law at the international 
and U.S. federal government levels, the market-based initiatives at the 
regional, state and local level can offer some hope to solve our climate 
change problems.  This part of the Article looks at U.S. regional cap-and-
trade systems, and then examines state and local carbon taxes, focusing 
on British Colombia, Boulder, San Francisco, Oregon, and Washington. 
A.  Regional Cap-and-Trade Initiatives 
The history of regional cap-and-trade programs in the U.S. has been 
rather tumultuous. California set up a cap-and-trade system, which originally 
 
 287.  See id. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  See Shurtz, supra note 10. 
 290.  CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 222. Energy efficiency certificate trading 
are also needed. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists say: The government 
must implement parallel policies alongside a cap-and-trade regime to ensure development 
and deployment of the full range of clean technologies Studies have shown that a 
comprehensive approach including these parallel policies would lower the price for 
allowances, cut emissions, and save consumers money by lowering their electric and 
gasoline bills.  Id. at 4. 
 291.  See WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 23. 
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included six Western states and two Canadian provinces but now includes 
only California and Québec.292 The Chicago Climate Exchange founded 
in 2003 boasted big company participants like Ford, Amtrak, but went 
defunct in 2010.293  The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
established in 2005, has had New Jersey withdraw, and had to shrink its 
cap by 45%.294 
1.  The Western Climate Initiative Has Failed 
The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 set goals for California to reduce 
its greenhouse gas.295  In 2007, Governors Arnold Schwarzenegger of California, 
Bill Richardson of New Mexico, Ted Kulongoski of Oregon and Christine 
Gregoire of Washington signed an agreement, called the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI).296  Later the governors of Utah and Montana and the premiers 
of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Québec joined as partners.297  An 
additional 14 jurisdictions joined including Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, 
Kansas, Nevada, Wyoming and the Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia 
and Saskatchewan and even Mexican states of Baja Chihuahua, Coahuila 
Nuevo León, Sonara and Tamaulipas.298 In September 2008, the WCI released a 
document calling for economy-wide emission program covering “nearly 90% 
of the region’s greenhouse gas emissions.”299 The program was to reduce 
emissions 15% below 2005 levels by 2020 and start mandatory emission 
monitoring starting January 2010.300 Under the WCI, each state and province 
agreed to set up their own cap-and-trade regime and link with the other 
 
 292.  Multi-State Climate Initiatives, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http:// 
www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-climate-initiatives [hereinafter CCES] (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2015); Michael Hiltzik, Emissions Cap-and-Trade Program is Working Well in 
California, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-
hiltzik-20150613-column.html. 
 293.  See generally Ilan Gutherz, Current Developments in Carbon & Climate Law 
North America: United States, 8 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 69, 70 (2014). 
 294.  Id. (“[RGGI] announced that it would reduce the available number of GHG 
allowances for 2014 by 45 percent to correct for a significant oversupply in the market. 
The cap will be reduced by 2.5 % annually through 2020”). 
 295.  The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, 2006 CAL. STAT. 
3419 (to be codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 et seq.). 
 296.  Western Climate Initiative Work Plan: October 2007–August 2008, W. CLIMATE 
INITIATIVE 2 (Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/document-archives/ 
general/workplans/2008-WCI-Work-Plan/. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Id. at 3; see also CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, supra note 295; 
and Design for the WCI Regional Program, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE (July 2010), http:// 
www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/program-design [hereinafter 
WCI Design]. 
 300.  WCI Design, supra note 299, at 5. 
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systems.  Each jurisdiction could verify the other jurisdiction’s program.301 
In addition, they agreed to share information and management in support 
of such a system.302  Nevertheless, unresolved issues arose, “including 
allowance apportionment between the states and among the sectors, 
percentages of allowances to be auctioned, design and structure of both 
the auction market and the market oversight and enforcement mechanisms 
to address market manipulation, and the use of offsets.”303 
From 2008 to 2011, the WCI began to fall apart.304 First, elections occurred 
in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, whose new governors opposed cap-
and-trade.305 Second, state legislatures in Washington, Oregon, and Montana 
failed to enact carbon trading schemes.306 Third, the Great Recession 
occurred. Finally, in November 2011, six states withdrew from the WCI.307  
In that same month, in an attempt to salvage the plan, the Western Climate 
Initiative, a nonprofit corporation was formed.308  Its function now is limited 
to providing  “administrative and technical support to state and provincial 
governments” implementing cap-and-trade programs.309 On the whole, the 
Western Climate Initiative has failed. 
2.  It is Too Early to Pronounce the CA Cap-and-Trade                          
Program a Success 
The current CA Cap-and-Trade program was implemented under the 
Global Warming Solutions Act under AB32, the state’s landmark carbon 
dioxide legislation of 2006.310 The ARB is in charge of its design and 
implementation.311 The cap-and-trade covers the “broadest range of industries 
 
 301.  Id. at 2–3. 
 302.  Gannett, supra note 64, at 8-4. 
 303.  Warren & Tomashefsky, supra note 171, at 57. 
 304.  Gannett, supra note 64, at 8-5. 
 305.  Geoffrey Craig, Six US States Leave the Western Climate Initiative, PLATTS, 
(Nov. 18, 2011, 4:15 PM EST), http://www.platts.ru/latest-news/electric-power/washington/six- 
us-states-leave-the-western-climate-initiative-6695863. 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  History, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history (last 
visited May 5, 2016). 
 309.  See CCES, supra note 292. 
 310.  Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD. (Aug. 5, 
2014), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm. 
 311.  The California Air Resources Boards’ Climate Change Scoping Plan Updates 
the past five years and outlook.  Id.  Looking ahead—collaborative efforts with others, allocation 
rules, market program and offset program implementation. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, 
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of any such program in North America,” including transportation.312 Over 
85% of California’s GHG emissions are covered by the regime.313 
Because of interstate commerce issues the program does not cover planes 
or ships with destinations beyond the state border.314  It does cover “carbon 
by wire”—emissions from out-of-state coal and natural gas plants that sell 
electricity into the state’s grid.315 Exemptions also occur for agricultural 
and food producers.316 
The cap-and-trade system is fairly straightforward and simple.  It is 
imposed upstream on some 600 companies.317 It provides for banking but 
not borrowing.318 The trading is tightly regulated so gaming is unlikely.319  
The ARB carefully restricts and monitor offsets, which have to be third-
party verified.320  Firms can substitute offsets for reforestation programs and 
methane recapture from livestock manure for 8% of their emissions permits.321 
Allocation of permits were not grandfathered, but based on a combination 
of free allowances and auctioned ones. In 2013 and 2014, the ARB distributed 
about 90% of the permits free of charge.322 These free permits were given 
to large industrial firms whose products compete with products from 
outside of California and to large electric and natural gas utilities.323 In 
addition, extra permits were given to companies that had been the most 
successful in reducing their emissions.324  When the cap expands in 2015, 
most of the new permits—those for petroleum and other fuels, will be 
auctioned.325  CA Cap-and-Trade does not allow waivers and exemptions 
but has a price containment reserve that holds back a few percent of permits 
 
at 57; see also Hiltzik, supra note 292 (noting that this legislation included mandates for 
renewable fuels and emissions standards for new vehicles). 
 312.  Hiltzik, supra note 292; see also Durning & Bauman, supra note 231 (“[C]ap 
will be the most comprehensive, though not the most aggressive, carbon-pricing regime in 
the world.”). 
 313.  Durning & Bauman, supra note 231. 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  Id. (pointing out the comparison between BC, which only covers only fossil 
fuel, and Northeast Regional and EU that only cover electricity, but that California covers 
both plus “carbon by wire.”). 
 316.  See id. 
 317.  Id. 
 318.  See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 319.  Durning & Bauman, supra note 231. 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  Id. 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Id. at 3–4. 
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in reserve so that if the carbon prices rise too high, these permits can go 
to auction.326 
It is too early to make statements as to the regime’s effectiveness.327  
However, the markets have been working effectively with current prices 
around $12.73.328 Approximately $3.5 billion of revenue was raised since 
2012.329 The system has been linked to Québec and plans are in the works 
to link with Ontario and the EU ETS.330 
One aim of the CA Cap-and-Trade is to reduce the state’s carbon emissions 
to 1990 levels by 2020.331 To meet these 1990 levels emissions must be 
cut by almost 16%.332  However, the cap was initially set too high and the prices 
remained exceptionally low.333  The cap is restricted to a ceiling of approximately 
$40-50 so as not to harm the California economy.334  In addition, a price 
floor exists ($11.34 in 2014 dollars).  A floor price is set which rises slightly 
each year and the total supply of emissions permits will decline by 2-3 % 
per year until 2020.335 Governor Brown is advocating more stringent 
targets for 2020-2030. He issued a nonbinding executive order to reduce 
emissions an additional 80% by 2050.336Another aim of the cap-and-trade 
 
 326.  Id. at 9. 
 327.  Id. at 2. Durning and Bauman note that California’s emission rose from 1996 to 
2007 and then dropped during the Great Recession. Id. To return to 1990 levels by 2020 
will require a 5% drop below the 2011 levels. Because California’s population continues 
growing quickly, emissions per capital will have to be reduced even more. Mary D. Nichols, 
the chairwoman of the California Air Resources Board, which administers cap-and-trade, 
states that “[a]t $12 a ton . . . ‘that’s enough of a signal for industries to make dramatic 
investments in clean energy.’” Hiltzik, supra note 292. However this is disputed by 
Severin Borenstein, an energy expert at UC Berkeley’s Haas School of Business in the 
same article. Id. 
 328.   CALFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CA Cap-and-Trade Program and Québec 
Cap-and-Trade System February 2016 Joint Auction #6 Summary Results Report 4 (Feb. 
17, 2016), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/feb-2016/summary_results_report.pdf. 
 329.  Id. at 3. 
 330.  See CCES, supra note 292 (“As of  January 1, 2014, California’s program is linked 
to that of Québec”); see also Malin Ahlberg et al., Linking Different Emissions Trading 
Systems—Current State and Future Perspectives, GER. EMISSIONS TRADING AUTH. 1, 8, 11 
(May 2013), http://www.rnei.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ETS-Current-State-and-Future- 
Perspectives.pdf (discussing the prospects of linking California’s Cap-and-Trade to Ontario’s 
and the EU ETS’). 
 331.  See Durning & Bauman, supra note 231. 
 332.  Id. 
 333.  Ravi, supra note 218. 
 334.  Id. 
 335.  Id. 
 336.  Durning & Bauman, supra note 231. 
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system is “to encourage other governments to act to combat rising GHG.”337 
California produces 1% to 1.5% of the world’s greenhouse gases,338 so even 
if California reduces its emission, other governments need to join them to 
make an effective difference in the world. As of January 2014, only Québec 
and California have linked their programs.339 Allowances in California are 
expected to drive the price in the two jurisdictions.340 
Thus far, the system has had no adverse impacts on the economy, although 
the price of gas did go up around 10 cents.341  The revenues collected through 
2014 were $969 million and an estimated $3.4 to $10.3 billion more could 
be collected by 2020.342  All funds from the auctions go into the Greenhouse 
Gas Reduction Fund,343 which focuses on (1) sustainable communities and 
clean transportation, (2) energy efficiency and clean energy, and (3) natural 
resource and waste diversion.344  Twenty-five percent of the funds are to 
go into the high-speed rail from L.A. to San Francisco, 35% into disadvantaged 
communities and some mass-transit, and 40% to the state legislature to 
decide where the remaining funds should go.345 
A July 2014 poll found that the majority of Californians would not 
support a cap-and-trade if it meant paying more for electricity or gas.346 
The program will inevitably cause a rise in utility bills. Although some 
consumers may be able to reduce their use of cars and substitute mass 
transportation, electricity is inelastic and consumers cannot easily change 
their behavior and substitute another product.347 The California Legislative 
Analyst’s Office estimates that gas prices will rise “between 13 and 50 cents 
 
 337.  Ravi, supra note 218. 
 338.  Hiltzik, supra note 292 (stating California produces 1% of world’s greenhouse 
gases); but see Ravi, supra note 218 (stating 1.5%). 
 339.  Gutherz, supra note 293, at 70; see also WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 57. 
 340.  See Gutherz, supra note 293, at 70 (“Québec’s carbon market is significantly 
smaller than California’s, the demand for allowances in the California market is expected 
to drive price in the two jurisdictions”). 
 341.  Severin Borenstein, Op-Ed, Learning to Love Paying 10 Cents More Per Gallon, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-borenstein-gas-
prices-emissions-20141214-story.html (stating that California’s oil and gas industry predicted 
that it would drive up gas prices 16 to 76 cents per gallon); see also Chandiok, supra note 
273, at 265–66 (“California’s successes . . . are a guide for other states who are trying to 
design a climate change law that will survive the inevitable legal challenges.”). 
 342.  Ravi, supra note 218; see also Durning & Bauman, supra note 231 (study states 
$2 billion a year for the rest of this decade). 
 343.  Durning & Bauman, supra note 231 (“AB 32 passed by simple majority in 2006, 
granting power to ARB to establish a cap and trade.”). Thus, a state agency can impose 
fees authorized by simple majorities. Id. 
 344.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 114. 
 345.  Ravi, supra note 218. 
 346.  Id. 
 347.  Warren & Tomashefsky, supra note 171, at 59. 
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per gallon by 2020” and electric bills “could rise between 5% and 12%.”348 
And because this is a fee and not a tax, no rebates or tax shifting off labor 
are allowed.349 If enough voters oppose the cap-and-trade, it could be repealed.  
Thus, it is too soon to declare this program a success. 
3.  The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord Has Failed 
The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA) or 
Midwestern Accord, was established in 2007 and covered six U.S. states 
(Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) and one 
Canadian province (Manitoba).350  Another three U.S. states and one Canadian 
province were formally observing this process.351 Under the Accord, the 
members agreed to set up a multi-sector cap-and trade system and meet 
targets of 60–80% below 2007 emission levels.352 In early 2008, participating 
jurisdictions appointed an Advisory Group comprised of representatives 
from environmental groups, industry and participating jurisdictions to 
develop recommendations on a regional cap-and-trade program.353  In 
May 2009, the Advisory Group released their draft of final design 
recommendations.354  After releasing their draft in April 2010, “the states 
and province in MGGRA did not continue pursuing their greenhouse gas 
goals under the Accord.”355  Thus, the Midwestern initiative has failed. 
4.  The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Has Been a Success 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was established in 2005 
and has been the most successful cap-and-trade in North America.356  It 
 
 348.  Id. 
 349.  Durning & Bauman, supra note 231.  Still, the California Public Utility Commission 
ordered Pacific Gas and Electric to give “climate credits” averaging $35 to residential customers 
for several months a years. Id. 
 350.  CCES, supra note 292. 
 351.  Id. 
 352.  Id. 
 353.  Chris Lau & Nicholas Bianco, The Bottom Line on Regional Cap-and-Trade 
Programs, 13 WORLD RES. INST. 1, 2 (July 2009), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/ 
default/files/pdf/bottom_line_regional_cap_and_trade.pdf. 
 354.  CCES, supra note 292. 
 355.  Id. 
 356.  Id.; Jason Brown, RGGI States Make Major Cuts to Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Power Plants, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.rggi. 
org/docs/PressReleases/PR011314_AuctionNotice23.pdf; Chandiok, supra note 273, at 
n.197 (citing Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Program, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS 
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initially covered ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States (Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island and Vermont).  It aims to reduce emissions from electric power 
and thus applies only to emission from regulated fossil fuel power plants 
that “together produce 95% of the region’s electric-generation carbon 
emissions.”357 Importantly, it did not include the transportation, agriculture, 
commercial and residential sectors of the economy.  Thus, it is more limited 
in scope than the CA Cap-and-Trade. 
Under the RGGI, each state limits emissions, issues allowances and 
encourages participation in regional auctions.358  Thus, state programs are 
integrated into a single regional market for carbon emissions.  RGGI, like 
the California program, included banking allowances and soft price ceilings 
and a minimum auction price.359  Unlike the EU Cap-and-Trade program, 
however, the majority of the allowances were auctioned off in 2008.360  
Subsequent auctions have occurred quarterly. So far, these auctions have 
earned more than $1.5 billion since 2009 and over 80% of the revenue has 
gone back to programs in renewable energy projects, energy efficiency 
programs and other initiatives to benefit the consumer.361 
RGGI can be applauded for its flexibility in making changes to its cap.  
The cap was criticized because it was set too high and thus the prices were 
seen as too low.362 Thus, RGGI updated and reduced the cap by 45% in 
January 2014.363 The cap was set at 188 million short tons of carbon for 
the first control period (2009-2011) and then reduced to 91 million short 
tons.364 The cap will be reduced by 2.5% each year from 2015 to 2020.365 
Some say this “increase in stringency is dramatic and represents evidence” 
that cap-and-trade systems can be subsequently modified.366 Others might 
 
INITIATIVE 2 (Oct. 2007), http://www.rggi.org/doc/program_summer_10_07.pdf); Regulated 
Sources, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/design/overview/regulated 
_sources (last visited Jan. 1, 2016). 
 357.  Gannett, supra note 64, at 7; Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Program, 
REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 2 (Oct. 2007), http://www.rggi.org/doc/program_ 
summer_10_07.pdf. 
 358.  Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Program, supra note 356, at 4. 
 359.  Gannett, supra note 64, at 7–8. 
 360.  Id. 
 361.  Id.; Chandiok, supra note 273, at 275 n.198. 
 362.  See Gutherz, supra note 293, at n.8 (citing The RGGI CO2 Cap, REG’L GREENHOUSE 
GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 
2016)). 
 363.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 58 (“The new 2014 cap is 91 million short tons 
of CO2, representing a 45% reduction form the previous cap”). 
 364.  Id. 
 365.  Id.; The cost containment reserve CR was triggered for the first time in March 
2014.  Id. 
 366.  Wara, supra note 154, at 35. 
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say the cap is too low—that by 2020, we must cut 15 to 20% off current 
levels, and the RGGI decline does not meet that standard.367 Empirical studies 
have shown that the emissions were 40% lower than in 2005; however, 
many factors were cited as contributing to this reduction.368 
The RGGI economies have grown.  An independent study by the Analysis 
Group projected positive economic outcomes including $1.6 billion in net 
economic benefits, $1.1 billion in electricity bill savings for consumers, 
16,000 additional jobs, and $765 million retained in local economies due 
to reduced fossil fuel demand.369 Despite this favorable economic report, 
New Jersey, with the urging of Governor Christie, withdrew from the 
program in 2011.370  In New Hampshire, the House tried to end the state 
participation in RGGI by 2015 and a compromise was passed in the Senate 
stating that if two other New England states withdraw then New Hampshire 
will withdraw.371  In addition, a conservative group tried to block New York’s 
 
 367.  CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 222. 
 368.  Richard Cowart, Carbon Caps and Efficiency Resources: How Climate Legislation 
can Mobilize Efficiency and Lower the Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction, 33 
VT. L. REV. 202, 213–18 (2008). The power sector’s greenhouse gas emissions are more 
than 40% lower in the RGGI region than they were in 2005. Id. at 213.  There are many 
factors that contribute to this reduction, including improved energy efficiency measures, a 
broad switch from coal and oil to natural gas use in power plants, carbon price signals, and 
regulatory predictability. Id. 
 369.  Paul Hibbard et al., The Economic Impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
on Nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States, ANALYSIS GRP., 1, 11, 19 (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing/analysis_group
_rggi_report_july_2015.pdf. 
 370.  Harriet Shugarman, Fact Sheet: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, (RGGI), 
N.J. PUB. POL’Y NETWORK 1, 2 (Nov. 11, 2011), http://uulmnj.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/rggi_fact_sheet.pdf. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie stated that “our analysis 
of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative or RGGI reveals that this program is not 
effective in reducing greenhouse gases and is unlikely to be in the future.” Id. The governor 
called it a “failure” because of low auction prices and industry’s ease of compliance. Id. 
Several environmental groups challenged the governor’s actions, with some success. See 
Jonathan D. Salant, Christie’s withdrawal from air pollution compact has cost N.J. $114M, 
Pallone says, NJ ADVANCE MEDIA FOR NJ.COM (Mar. 18, 2015, 12:11 AM), http://www.nj.com/ 
politics/index.ssf/2015/03/rep_pallone_says_christies_withdrawal_from_regiona.html. See 
also Chris Fallon, Appeals Panel: Christie Administration Improperly Pulled N.J. Out of 
Program to Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Mar. 25, 2014, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/appeals-panel-christie-administration-improperly-pulled-
n-j-out-of-program-to-cut-greenhouse-gas-emissions-1.750770. 
 371.  Matthew Spolar, Negotiators Reach RGGI Deal, CONCORD MONITOR, May 26, 
2012, http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/332107/negotiators-reach-rggi-deal. 
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participation but this failed.372 Despite these minor glitches, the RGGI seems 
to be going strong and must be considered a success.373 
5.  Conclusion 
What we can learn from these emissions trading programs is their success 
will largely depend on the political will of the state, the administrative 
details of the program (its scope, the cap, the allocation approach, use of 
offsets, price stabilization mechanisms, and enforcement) its performance 
and effectiveness, its ability to be flexible given the need for change based 
on competitiveness or efficacy concerns, and its ability to link to other 
systems. What is needed is for the original signers of the Western Climate 
Change to join the California and Québec Cap-and-Trade systems.  Then, 
California should link to Alberta, Ontario and other state and provinces in 
North America.  The Midwestern initiative should be revived and RGGI 
should be expanded to cover transportation. All systems should be 
coordinated with similar auction allowances, sector coverage, and cap limits.374 
North America needs to be the leader in the reduction of carbon dioxide 
emissions.375 Canada and the U.S. have been some of the largest polluters 
of carbon and will also be some of the biggest beneficiaries from the melting 
ice.  Since the impact of climate change will fall mainly on poor countries, 
it is imperative that the richer countries take the lead in these climate 
initiatives. 
 
 372.  John C. Dernbach et al., United States: Making the States Full Partners in a National 
Climate Change Effort: A Necessary Element for Sustainable Economic Development, 
MONDAQ (Aug. 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/103786/Climate+Change/ 
Making+the+States+Full+Partners+in+a+National+Climate+Change+Effort+A+Necessa
ry+Element+for+Sustainable+Economic+Development+. 
 373.  Wara, supra note 154, at 293. “(O)verallocation and a general lack of stringency 
are serious concerns in many cap-and-trade programs.” Id. However, if they become too 
stringent then evidence exists that programs will be weakened (i.e., RECLAIM and CA 
Bill 32). WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 58. The RGGI states have submitted comments 
to the EPA in relation to the Clean Air Act, advocating flexibility in how states approach 
carbon pollution, emphasizing market-based approach over a regulatory approach and 
emphasizing the need to reward early actors. Rob Klee et al., RGGI States’ Comments on 
Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 1 (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www. 
rggi.org/docs/PressReleases/PR110714_CPP_Joint_Comments.pdf. 
 374.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22 at 58. Fifty percent of the total GHG emissions in 
Alberta are covered by the Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program. Facilities that 
emit more than 0.1Mt CO2e per year are required to reduce their emissions by 12% or buy 
permits. Id. at 42. 
 375.  Id. Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program could also be linked, but 
challenges include political aversion to “new taxes,” the powerful fossil fuel interest 
groups, and divergent and diffuse interests of the public. However, looming deficits and 
real environmental concerns could result in change. 
SHURTZ(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  10:31 AM 
[VOL. 7:  61, 2015–16]  Carbon Pricing Initiatives 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 113 
B.  State and Province Carbon Tax and Other Initiatives 
Some states in the U.S. and provinces in Canada have established creative 
climate change initiatives.  Some of these are merely aspirational in tone.  
However, others, such as carbon taxes in British Columbia, Boulder and 
San Francisco, have been effective in reducing CO2 emissions with minimal 
economic impact.  This section examines those initiatives. 
1.  Many State and Local Initiatives are Merely Aspirational 
Climate change initiatives at the local level have tended to focus on GHG 
mitigation.376 Cities work with International Council for Local Environmental 
Initiatives (ICLEI),377 the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA),378 
and C40 Cities (a climate leadership group),379 to inventory emissions, 
develop climate action plans, and pursue sustainable development goals. 
States and regions have also signed agreements to fight climate change. 
All of these initiatives are voluntary and thus do not by themselves guarantee 
effective climate change policy.380 However, like the countries in the 
recent COP 21, local governments can band together with other cities and 
become agents for change in the world war against climate change. 
The Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICIEI) “serves as a 
clearinghouse on sustainable development and environmental protection 
policies, programs, and techniques, initiates joint projects or campaigns 
among groups of local governments, organizes training programs, and 
publishes reports and technical manuals on the art of environmental 
management practices.”381  As of October 2015, more than one thousand 
 
 376.  See Trisolini, supra note 15, at 679. 
 377.  ICLEI Members, INT’L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL ENVTL. INITIATIVES (ICLEI), http://www. 
iclei.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2016); see also Mayors Leading the Way on Climate Protection, 
MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR. (2009), http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/revised. 
 378.  This initiative should be contrasted with the EU Covenant of Mayors which has 
“a more binding nature.” See Dellinger, supra note 16, at 632 (“But whereas the Covenant 
appears to be both procedurally and substantively successful, more action needs to be 
demonstrated by the MCPA and GreenClimateCities before these can reasonably be 
determined to be effective. . .”). 
 379.  C40 CITIES, http://www.c40cities.org/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
 380.  See Duff, supra note 9, at 2075–76 (stating that these voluntary agreements have 
their place in the global warming fight). 
 381.  International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), SUSTAINABLE 
CMTYS. ONLINE (2016), http://www.sustainable.org/creating-community/inventories-and-
indicators/149-international-council-for-local-environmental-initiatives-iclei; see also Green 
ClimateCities Program: A Pathway to Urban Low-Carbon Development, INT’L COUNCIL 
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cities were members of ICLEI, including Portland, Seattle, San Francisco 
and other major cities in Western North America and around the globe.382 
ICLEI’s first initiative was the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) 
campaign that focused on the following five “milestones”: (1) require a 
baseline emissions inventory; (2) set forth an emissions reduction target 
for the forecast year; (3) develop a local plan of action by involving 
community stakeholders; (4) implement the plan and policies; and (5) 
monitor and verify results.383 Unfortunately, these last steps are still lacking 
in many places.384 ICLEI’s newest initiative, launched in June 2012, is the 
GreenClimateCities Program.385 Here, a three-step approach is adopted: (1) 
analyzation  (again doing a GHG inventory, identify opportunities for 
emissions reduction, etc.), (2) action (develop a mitigation and adaptation 
action plan, identify finances for projects, etc.), and (3) acceleration (measure 
progress and report on achievements).386 As a result of their effort, “232 
cities from 25 countries . . . reported 561 climate and energy commitments, 
557 GHG inventories, and a total of 2092 mitigation and adaptation 
actions.”387 The problem is that all of this is voluntary with no enforcement 
method to assure compliance, other than the “threat of potential public 
scorn.”388 To conclude: ICLEI is just “too new to demonstrate any substantive 
success.”389  However, in the absence of binding global and federal 
initiatives, it is definitely a promising program. 
The Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA) has been adopted 
by over one thousand mayors, within all 50 of the states (plus the District 
of Columbia and Puerto Rico.)390  Again, the mayors of Seattle, Portland, 
and San Francisco have signed this simple one-page agreement.391  The 
agreement strives to beat the Kyoto Protocol target of 7% GHG reduction 
within the city and urges the mayors to try to get their state and federal 
 
FOR LOCAL ENVTL. INITIATIVES, http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/PUBLICATIONS/Brochures/ 
ICLEI_GreenClimateCities_Brochure.pdf. 
 382.  Local Governments for Sustainability, INT’L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL ENVTL. 
INITIATIVES, http://www.iclei.org/iclei-members/iclei-members.html (last visited Jan. 2, 
2016). 
 383.  Five Milestones of Emissions Management, INT’L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL ENVTL. 
INITIATIVES, http://www.iciei.org/index.php?id=810 (last visited May 4, 2016). 
 384.  See Dellinger, supra note 16, at 634. 
 385.  Id. at 635. 
 386.  Id. 
 387.  Id. at 636. 
 388.  Id. at 636–37. 
 389.  Id. at 637. 
 390.  List of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR. (2007), http://www. 
usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp. 
 391.  Id.; see also The U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement—
Signature Page, THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/ 
mayorsclimateagreementsignaturepage.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2016). 
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governments (including the U.S. Congress) to enact GHG reduction 
legislation.392  Unfortunately, the 7% target reduction now needs to be 
increased “tenfold.”393 Thus, the MCPA “appears to have become more of 
a political public relations tool than an agreement with much real bite.”394 
The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group is also a voluntary group of 
cities concerned with climate change.  Now in its 10th year, it includes over 
75 cities in its membership, covering over 500 million people and one 
quarter of the world’s economy.395 It focuses on “tackling climate change 
and driving urban action that reduces greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
risks, while increasing the health wellbeing and economic opportunities 
of urban citizens.”396 As a primer to the recent meeting in Paris, C40 
showcased research and stories “that help explain why a global agreement 
on climate change matters, and why cities are so important to the success 
of any agreement.”397 
In addition to the aspirational city initiatives,398 many state and regional 
initiatives exist at the state and regional level in western North America.  
For example, in 2008, The Pacific Coast Collaborative (PCC), was 
established and signed by Alaska, British Columbia, Washington, Oregon 
and California.399  The aim here is to promote clean energy innovation and 
low-carbon developments to reduce climate change in the region.  Through 
the PCC, jurisdictions hope to “coordinate, propose, and adopt policy 
frameworks aimed at generating investment in renewable energy, climate 
resilience, low-carbon transportation infrastructure, and environmental 
conservation.”400  Then, in 2009, California, Washington and Oregon signed 
a climate change pact with British Columba stating their intent to implement 
cap-and-trade programs, and achieve long-term reductions in GHG 
emissions.401 While not binding, this pact represents a commitment to 
 
 392.  U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, THE U.S. CONFERENCE 
OF MAYORS (2008), http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm. 
 393.  Dellinger, supra note 16, at 633. 
 394.  Id. 
 395.  About C40, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/about (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
 396.  Id. 
 397.  C40 CITIES, supra note 395. 
 398.  See Kenneth Abbott, Arizona State University, Presentation at the Seventh Annual 
San Diego Climate and Energy Law Symposium (Nov. 6, 2015). 
 399.  CCES, supra note 292, at § 4. 
 400.  Id. 
 401.  Paul Rogers, Climate Change Pact Signed by California, Oregon, Washington 
and British Columbia, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 29. 2013, http://www.mercury 
news.com/ci_24406734/california-oregon-washington-andbritish-columbia-sign-climate; 
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multilateral cooperation and, like the other initiatives, is hopeful but not 
binding.402  Thus, it appears that many cities are following the global approach, 
which is just to enter into nonbinding “soft” agreements that can easily by 
avoided. 
2.  Some State and Local Carbon Taxes Have Been Successful 
Luckily, some state and local initiatives in the Western North America 
are more binding.  Those would include the provincial carbon tax in British 
Columbia and the local carbon taxes in Boulder, Colorado and San Francisco, 
California. This section also highlights the proposed carbon taxes in Oregon 
and Washington. 
a.  British Columbia 
In July 2008, British Columbia introduced its carbon tax.403 The BC 
carbon tax is just one of the key parts of the Climate Action Plan to reduce 
BC’s GHG emissions by 33% below 2007 levels by 2020.404 The BC tax 
 
see also Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy, PAC. COAST COLLABORATIVE 
(Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.pacificcoastcollaborative.org/Documents/Pacific%20Coast%20 
Climate%20Action%20Plan.pdf. 
 402.  John Stegman, Cooperative State Cap and Trade to Mitigate Climate Change, 
55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 215, 225–26 n.67 (2015). 
 403.  Carbon Tax, B.C., MINISTRY OF FIN. (2015), http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/ 
climate/carbon_tax.htm. Québec and Alberta have similar taxes but they are limited. See 
Mori, supra note 216. British Columbia combines several policies to reduce GHG 
emissions by 33% by 2020 and by 80% by 2050, compared to 2007 levels. Climate Action, 
B.C., MINISTRY OF TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/ 
transportation/transportation-environment/climate-action (last visited May 4, 2016). 
 404.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86. British Columbia successfully implemented 
the GHG reduction initiative in the transportation sector by imposing a parking fee, the 
proceeds of which are used to offer incentives to City employees to encourage them to carpool, 
walk or bike, or take public transportation to work. See Sustainable Commuting, CITY OF 
VANCOUVER, http://vancouver.ca/green-vancouver/sustainable-commuting-for-staff.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2016). British Columbia’s Sustainable Commuting Program offers: 
1.   Rebates on transit passes; 
2.   Monthly incentives and access to reserved parking for staff who share rides; 
3.   Incentives for biking, walking, skateboarding, and rollerblading, such as gift cards    
for rain gear; 
4. Cycling skills courses and subsidized bike tune-ups; and a “guaranteed ride home” 
program in the event of emergency or sickness. 
See Campus & Community Planning, Transportation Options, THE UNIV. OF B.C., http:// 
planning.ubc.ca/vancouver/transportation-planning/transportation-options (last visited Jan. 
2, 2016). British Columbia has also recently created a program called LiveSmart on the 
Road. See LiveSmart on the Road, LIVESMART BC (2015), http://www.livesmartbc.ca/ 
road. The LiveSmart on the Road program provides incentives for people to scrap old, 
inefficient cars instead of selling them and provides additional incentives for people who 
buy clean-energy vehicles under a component program called the Clean Energy Vehicle 
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has at least four core features that have remained the same as when first 
enacted and have contributed to its success.405 
First, the tax is broad based—taxing twenty carbon-based fossil fuels, 
each at different rates.406 It covers “approximately three-quarters of all the 
GHG emissions in the province.”407 Some legitimate leakage occurs with 
exemptions in the agriculture sector and for marine and aviation fuels.408 
Essentially the tax exempts fuel in interstate commerce and exported out 
of the province and taxes fuels coming in and being used in the province.409 
Despite its broad base, the tax has been criticized as it does not apply to 
certain industrial processes.410 These exemptions were based on the prospect 
 
Point of Sale Incentive Program. See Transportation Rebates and Incentives, LIVESMART 
BC (2015), http://www.livesmartbc.ca/incentives/transportation/CEV-rebates.html. As 
part of the LiveSmart on the Road program, British Columbia also offers rebates of up to 
$500 on residential electric car charging stations. Id. And, in January 2013, British Columbia 
invested $1.3 million in 13 new direct current (DC) fast-charging stations throughout the 
province to help electric vehicle owners charge their cars. David Karn, News Release: B.C. 
plugging in to electric vehicle fast chargers, B.C., MINISTRY OF ENV’T 1 (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2009-2013/2013ENV0002-000067.pdf. The 
cumulative effect of British Columbia’s combined public transportation, ride share, cycling, 
guaranteed ride home program, LiveSmart on the Road program, and Clean Energy Point 
of Sale Incentive Program is fewer individual fossil fuel burning commuters on the road, 
thus fewer GHGs being released into the atmosphere. See id.; LiveSmart on the Road, 
supra; Transportation Rebates and Incentives, supra. 
 405.  See LiveSmart on the Road, supra note 404; see also Rodney L. Brown Jr., 
State-by-State or Regional Solutions?, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. (2015); see also WORLD 
BANK, supra note 22, at 86. 
 406.  Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, P. 14, Schedule 1 (Can.). 
 407.  Brian C. Murray & Nicholas Rivers, British Columbia’s Revenue-Neutral Carbon 
Tax: A Review of the Latest “Grand Experiment” in Environmental Policy, NICHOLAS 
INST., DUKE UNIV. 1 (May 2015), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ 
ni_wp_15-04_full.pdf. 
 408.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 79. These are considered the “trade-exposed” 
sectors. The Effects of H.R. 2454 on International Competiveness and Emission Leakage 
in Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries: An Interagency Report Responding to a 
Request from Senators Bayh, Specter, Stabenow, McCaskill, and Brown, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY 10 (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://sallan.org/pdf-docs/EPAReport_Steelv Cement.pdf.  
“Exported fuels and fuel consumption by aviation and shipping also travelling outside 
British Columbia are not covered by the carbon tax. Non-combustion GHG emissions such 
as industrial process emissions, venting and fugitive emissions are not covered either.” 
WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 79. From 2014, “80% exemption to the carbon tax on 
natural gas and propane for heating and CO2 production for green house growers, and 
exemption for colored gasoline and colored diesel purchased by farmers.”  WORLD BANK, 
supra note 22, at 79. 
 409.  Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 94. 
 410.  Id. (“such as the production of oil, gas, aluminum, or cement”) 
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of the implementation of a cap-and-trade system covering these industries, 
but that initiative has failed.411  In addition, the tax also does not cover all 
GHG gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide.412 Thus, the tax is not 
as comprehensive as it could be. 
Second, the BC tax started at a low rate, varied depending upon the 
carbon content of the fuel, and increased gradually over the years.413  This 
gave consumers a warning of increased prices and certainty.414 It started 
at a relative low rate of CAD $10 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions and progressively increased each year by $5 until 2012, when 
it reached the final and current price of CAD $30 per ton.415 In 2008, that 
meant a 2.4 cents per liter increase in the price of gasoline and an increase 
of 6.7 cents per liter by 2012.416 The problem here is that the rate is now 
frozen and is not scheduled to increase further to reduce GHG emissions.  
The BC government has said it might increase those rates if it does not meet 
its emissions targets or if other jurisdictions pass similar carbon pricing 
instruments.417 
Third, the BC tax is simple, piggybacking on an existing fuel tax paid 
mostly by wholesalers,418  (although natural gas was paid at the retail level).419  
This upstream approach meant that the tax needs to be collected only from 
 
 411.  Id. at 95, n.52; see also WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86 (“The tax will be 
integrated with other measures”). 
 412.  Duff, supra note 30, at 94 (“from the disposal of solid waste and agricultural 
sector”). 
 413.  For an extensive analysis and charts of B.C.’s carbon tax shift, see Alan Durning 
& Yoram Bauman, All You Need to Know About BC’s Carbon Tax Shift in Five Charts, 
SIGHTLINE INST. (Mar. 11, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.sightline.org/2014/03/11/all-you-
need-to-know-about-bcs-carbon-tax-shift-in-five-charts/. 
 414.  Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 98; Clare Demerse, 
Proof Positive: The Mechanics and Impacts of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax, CLEAN 
ENERGY CAN. 2 , http://cleanenergycanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Carbon-Tax-
Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (“The tax started at $10 per metric ton of carbon 
dioxide-equivalent in 2008 and ramped up by $5 each year to reach $30 a ton by 2012. In 
2008, that meant a 2.4 cents per liter (US $.09/gallon) increase in the price of gasoline. By 
2012, the tax increased gas prices by 6.7 cents per liter ($0.25/gallon).”). 
 415.  Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 97. This tax 
translated into roughly for $10—and C$7.23 per liter of gasoline. WORLD BANK, supra 
note 22, at 79 (“CAN$30/tCO2e (US$28/tCO2e)”). 
 416.  Demerse, supra note 414, at 2. 
 417.  There are some problems here with such linkage. See discussion infra Part 
IV.B.2. 
 418.  Fuel wholesalers include fuel importers or domestic producers. Demerse, supra 
note 414, at 3 (“Wholesalers pass the tax on to retailers, who pass it on to consumer—who 
see it itemized on their receipts at the pump.”). 
 419.  Id.; WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86 (“carbon tax is applied and collected in 
the same way that motor fuel taxes are currently applied and collected, except for natural 
gas which is collected at the retail level”). 
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a limited number of companies,420 and it did not require any additional 
administration or enforcement resources.421 The tax is also transparent, as 
consumers see it itemized on their receipts at the pump, or on their gas 
bills.422 
Fourth, the carbon tax was designed to be economically efficient, politically 
feasible, and equitable.  The tax was originally planned to have the “double 
dividend” effect by being “revenue neutral,” meaning the revenues raised 
were to be returned or recycled or shifted to business and individuals by 
reducing other taxes.423 The tax has in fact been revenue negative.424  
Although it raised about $880 million in 2010/2011, all revenues (and 
more) are recycled back to taxpayers.425 In addition, when the tax was first 
imposed, all residents got a $100 dividend or rebate check as a “sweetener” 
to “reduce public opposition to the tax.”426  The tax also included a refundable 
Climate Action Tax Credit for low-income households.427  Thus, the tax 
was crafted to be politically palatable.  But if these credits and rebates 
were not enough, by law, the Minister of Finance is required to outline 
how the revenues are to be recycled.428  If the revenue neutrality cannot 
be ensured, the Minister’s salary will be cut 15%.429  Recent studies have 
found that the BC tax “does not disadvantage low-income residents” and 
is in fact “highly progressive, an effect enhanced by the provinces’ low-
income tax credits.”430 
 
 420.  Demerse, supra note 414, at 3. 
 421.  Id. at 2–3. 
 422.  Id. at 3. 
 423.  Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 96–100. This is 
in contrast to Québec, where revenues go to a Green Fund to support climate change initiative. 
Id. at 96–97. 
 424.  Mori, supra note 216, at 18–19. 
 425.  Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 98–99; see also 
Mori, supra note 216, at 16–19. 
 426.  Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 99. 
 427.  Id. at 99. 
 428.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86 
 429.  Id. 
 430.  Demerse, supra note 414, at 6. It is also possible that consumers can substitute 
public transportation for cars and thus reduce the regressive impact of the tax. Id. Tax on 
certain fuels, however, might not be inelastic, meaning the consumer might be able to 
substitute another energy form. Id. 
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In 2012, British Columbia conducted a five-year review of its carbon 
tax.431 Their economic analysis showed it had only a small impact on the 
economy and that the province continued to grow well compared to other 
Canadian provinces.432 Furthermore, statistics showed that the tax had reduced 
emissions by making carbon-intensive activities more expensive.433 
Consumption of petroleum products declined by 19%434 compared to an 
increase of 3% in the rest of Canada.435 
The public has generally supported the BC tax.436  Polls have shown that a 
majority of British Columbians supported the tax at its inception and a 
majority continue to support it today.437 In the 2009 election the governing 
party’s opposition ran on an “Axe the Tax” campaign to kill the carbon 
tax, but lost the election and later dropped their opposition to the tax.438 
Even the business community has been “mildly supportive” of the tax.439  
When interest groups complained after the 2012 review, the government 
made several concessions through grants and exemptions.440  Thus, it seems 
the BC tax is flexible in its implementation, integral to BC fiscal policy, 
and likely to remain in place.441 
However, this tax alone is not enough to effect significant climate change.  
The BC legislature specifically designed the carbon tax to be integrated 
with other measures, such as cap-and-trade programs.442 Because the carbon 
tax rate is frozen and the tax does not cover those industries that would 
have been subject to a cap-and-trade, BC should sign on to the California 
and Québec Cap-and-Trade system.443  They could also link up with the Alberta 
 
 431.  Marlo Lewis, Is British Columbia’s Carbon Tax a Model for the U.S.? , 
GLOBALWARMING.ORG (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.globalwarming.org/2014/08/07/is-british- 
columbias-carbon-tax-a-model-for-the-u-s/. 
 432.  Id. 
 433.  Mori, supra note 216, at 18 
 434.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 87. 
 435.  Stewart Elgie, British Columbia’s carbon tax shift: An environmental and 
economic success, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Sept. 10, 2014), http://blogs.worldbank.org/climate 
change/british-columbia-s-carbon-tax-shift-environmental-and-economic-success. 
 436.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 87. 
 437.  Demerse, supra note 414, at 4 (“Polling shows that a majority of British  
Columbians (54 percent) supported the tax when it was introduced, and a majority (52 percent) 
continue to support it today. In 2012, public support for the tax reached a high of 64 percent 
just as the tax reached its maximum level.”). Businesses were “cautiously accepting” of 
the carbon tax when it was first introduced. Id. 
 438.  Id. 
 439.  WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 87. 
 440.  Id. 
 441.  Id. 
 442.  Id. at 86. 
 443.  Duff, supra note 30, at 94; see also WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86. 
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system.444 In the alternative, the BC carbon tax base should be expanded 
and the rates increased. 
b.  Boulder’s Carbon Tax 
One city that has successfully implemented a carbon tax is Boulder, 
Colorado.  The carbon tax in Boulder was implemented in 2012 and will 
expire in 2018.445  Boulder’s carbon tax, which is officially called the 
Climate Action Plan Excise Tax, charges very low rates of $0.0049 per 
kWh for residential, $0.0009 per kWh for commercial, and $0.0003 per 
kWh for industrial consumers.446  Boulder effectuates this tax by stating 
directly in the City Code, § 3-12-1 that “the City Council determines and 
declares that the consumption of electricity within the City is the exercise 
of a taxable privilege.”447  Revenues are to be reinvested in environmental 
initiatives.448 Thus, Boulder’s implementation of the Climate Action Plan 
Excise Tax demonstrates that a city can declare energy usage within its 
jurisdictional boundaries to be a privilege that can be subject to taxation.  
Furthermore, by taxing centralized power consumption, cities can reinvest 
that money in policies that provide tax incentives for consumers who invest 
in localized power sources or green buildings that require less power to 
operate. Therefore, instituting a carbon tax can be the first step in creating 
a sustainable, GHG reduction plan for many cities.449 
 
 444.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
 445.  Boulder Climate Action Plan Excise Tax, BOULDER, COLO. REV. CODE §§ 3-12-
1, 3-12-2 (2012). 
 446.  Neha Bhatt & Michael Ryan, Carbon Energy Tax, SMALL GROWTH AM. 1, http:// 
www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/Boulder-Carbon-Tax.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). 
 447.  COLO. REV. CODE § 3-12-1. 
 448.  Id. 
 449.  Boulder is also proposing a 2.16 cents per KWh charge for cannabis growers. 
See Jan Lee, Boulder County Proposes Cannabis Carbon “Tax,” TRIPLE PUNDIT (Nov. 25, 
2014), http://www.triplepundit.com/2014/11/boulder-county-imposes-cannabis-carbon-tax 
(“According to one industry source, it takes about 5,000 kilowatt hours of electricity to 
grow about 2.2 pounds of good-quality pot.”). It is not yet clear how the tax will be used, but 
pesticide pollution and carbon dioxide levels are problems related to marijuana growing. 
Id. 
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c.  San Francisco’s Carbon Tax 
In 2008, San Francisco approved a carbon tax.450  Pursuant to this tax, 
more than 2,500 businesses were required to pay a low rate of 4.4 cents 
per ton for the carbon dioxide they emitted.451 Despite the relatively low 
tax rate, about seven power plants and oil refineries had to pay more than 
$50,000.452  These fees are expected to generate $1.1 million in the first 
year, which will be used to pay for emissions-reduction programs around 
the city.453 
Policy analysts say the relatively small fee probably will not cause business 
to change their practices or incentivize new clean technologies.454  However, 
these programs have already brought remarkable gains in climate change 
mitigation.  By 2010, the programs contributed to a reduction in carbon 
emissions by 12% below the 1990 levels.455  Specifically, in 2010, San 
Francisco’s citywide carbon footprint totaled 5.4 million metric tons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), down from 6.2 million metric tons in 
1990.456 This reduction translates to taking roughly 128,000 cars off the 
road, or avoiding burning 1.5 million barrels of oil per year.457  These 
tremendous reductions have exceeded emission reduction goals set forth 
by both the United Nations at the Kyoto Protocol, which called for emissions 
reductions of 7% by 2012.458  Furthermore, San Francisco’s impressive 
reduction in CO2 was achieved despite a growth in the City’s population.459  
In addition, all the revenues from the carbon tax are to be reinvested in 
green programs.460 Thus, the tax has set a precedent and raises significant 
revenue that can be reinvested in additional green initiatives that can help 
prevent climate change. 
The Bay Area Air Quality Management District’s board of directors voted 
15-1 in favor of the tax.461 Thus, San Francisco has demonstrated that 
government policy makers do not have to wait for federal and state mandates 
before taking action.  Cities can pursue grass-roots local-initiative that exceed 
 
 450.  San Francisco Approves Carbon Tax, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (May 22, 2008, 
7:50 AM), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/16079. 
 451.  Id. 
 452.  Id. 
 453.  Id. 
 454.  Id. 
 455.  San Francisco’s Leadership in Carbon Emission Reduction, THE GLOBAL COMPACT 
CITIES PROGRAMME, http://citiesprogramme.com/archives/1426 (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). 
 456.  Id. 
 457.  Id. 
 458.  Id. 
 459.  Id. 
 460.  SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM, supra note 450. 
 461.  Id. 
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the expectations of the larger governmental bodies and achieve exceptional 
results by implementing minimally intrusive carbon taxes. 
3.  Oregon and Washington’s Proposed Carbon Taxes 
In 2009, the Oregon Legislature considered a cap-and-trade program, but 
the bill did not make it out of committee.462  Then, in 2014, the Legislature 
proposed a carbon tax which would have taxed fuel suppliers (coal, natural 
gas and petroleum products) and utilities (on electricity). Exemptions were 
provided for fuels transported out of state and not used in the state and for 
fuels used in interstate commerce, such as maritime and aviation fuel.463  
The funds from the tax were to fund tax credits that would reduce personal 
income and corporate excise tax.  In addition, a part of the funds were to 
be used for the “construction or installation of alternative energy systems” 
and for “implementation of systems or programs that result in the reduction 
of the use of carbon fuels.”464  The tax was expected to start at $10/metric 
ton and increase until $60/metric ton by 2015.465 
The legislature commissioned the Northwest Economic Research Center 
at Portland State to study various combinations of tax rates and revenue 
uses.466  The study used various carbon prices (up to $60/ton) with reinvestment 
into energy efficiency programs of 10% and 25%.  The study concluded that 
a “BC-style carbon tax and shift could generate significant amount of revenue 
and reduce tax distortions while raising new jobs and reducing carbon 
emission.”467  Despite these favorable findings, the tax was never passed. 
A similar scenario happened in Washington State where Governor Jay 
Inslee proposed a carbon tax plan468 and Washington State Senator Kevin 
Ranker (D-Orcas Island) introduced a bill into Washington legislature 
 
 462.  Christina Williams, Oregon Steps Back from Western Climate Initiative, PORTLAND 
BUS. J. (June 20, 2014, 5:57 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/sbo/2011/11/ 
oregon-steps-back-from-western-climate.html. 
 463.  H.B. 2082, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015). 
 464.  Id. 
 465.  LIU & RENFRO, supra note 140, at 16 (“With a tax starting in 2013 with a $60 
maximum and $10 annual increase, in 2015 emissions would be 2% below the baseline 
forecast. . .”). 
 466.  Alan Durning & Yoram Bauman, Will Oregon Cook Up a Carbon Tax?, SIGHTLINE 
INST. (Apr. 1, 2014, 6:35 AM), http://www.sightline.org/2014/04/01/will-oregon-cook-
up-a-carbon-tax/. 
 467.  Id. 
 468.  John Stang, Turbulence ahead for Inslee’s climate plan, CROSSCUT.COM (Jan. 
16, 2015), http://crosscut.com/2015/01/supporters-push-inslees-climate-plan-legislative-a/. 
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creating a carbon tax system similar to the one in British Columbia. 469 
The tax was to be on fossil fuels as well as on the carbon content in electricity 
consumed within the state.  The tax rate was $15 per metric ton of carbon 
dioxide and increase to $25 by July 1, 2018, with automatic increases 
thereafter by 3 1/5 % plus inflation.470  All the revenue would go to the 
general budget, but unlike BC, there is no income tax in Washington.  Thus, 
the general sales tax could be reduced.  Like Oregon, the Washington 
legislature requested a study be done to assess the economic and equitable 
consequences.471  The study concluded, as did the Oregon economic study, 
that a tax system similar to British Columbia could be effective to help 
carbon emissions while maintaining a balance between economic growth 
and equity to low-income energy consumers.472 As of this writing, nothing 
has been passed, or is likely to pass in Washington or in Oregon. 
IV.  ASSESSMENT AND CHALLENGES TO REFORM 
Overall, my study of carbon tax and cap-and-trade initiatives results in 
the following conclusions: 
1. The number of world-wide carbon initiatives is disappointing. 
2. Cap-and-trade seems to be the dominant system world-wide, 
rather than carbon taxation. 
3. Many of the countries taking action are the richer countries 
that have benefited from GHG emissions in the past. 
4. Many cities, states, and regions propose climate change initiatives 
that are never implemented. 
5. Because of economic, business, and political concerns, many 
carbon initiatives are not that effective. 
6. These initiatives can only work with community support and 
political leadership. 
7. Market mechanisms will work best with mandates and other 
environmental policies to effectively combat climate change. 
8. North America should link and expand all cap-and-trade 
systems throughout the region (and world) and local states 
and cities should pass carbon taxes (while additional 
environmental initiatives should be implemented). 
 
 469.  Cassandra Profita, A Carbon Tax In Oregon?, OR. PUB. BROAD. (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.opb.org/news/blog/ecotrope/a-carbon-tax-in-oregon/. 
 470.  Initiative Measure No. 732, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, WASH. 5 (Mar. 20, 
2015), http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/FinalText_779.pdf. 
 471.  Keibun Mori, Washington State Carbon Tax, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF COMMERCE 1 
(July 2011), http://www.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/Washington-State-Carbon-Tax.pdf. 
 472.  Id. at 44–47. 
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The challenges to a North American comprehensive global warming 
regional and carbon pricing initiative are many.  First, constitutional issues 
arise as to whether these state and regional plans violate the interstate 
commerce or other constitutional doctrines. Second, design issues arise as 
to how different cap-and-trade regimes can work together and alongside 
carbon taxes.  Third, political issues arise as to whether cities, states and 
regions have the will to pass these measures.  What is clear is that ethically 
North America should move forward with these initiatives on a city, state 
and regional level. 
A.  Constitutional Hurdles 
Most local/regional tax and cap-and-trade programs in the U.S. are not 
going to violate the Commerce Clause or the EPA’s authority under the 
Clean Air Act if they are crafted appropriately.  Under the standards established 
by the courts, if the state regulates “even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest” affecting interstate commerce in an insignificant manner, 
it “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such comer is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”473 State regulations 
that impact some interstate commerce but that do not discriminate against 
interstate commerce will be upheld.474 
Usually, the carbon system will exempt aviation and maritime activities 
in interstate commerce, exempt exports and only tax imports.  This is done 
so the businesses within the state can compete fairly with businesses bringing 
their products into the state.  However, care must be taken to craft the carbon 
system appropriately. 
A recent Ninth Circuit case,475 challenging the California Air Resources 
Board’s (CARB) Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) under the Commerce 
Clause illustrates this issue. The challengers were arguing that  LCFS 
discriminated against ethanol producers from out-of-state.  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded stating that the LCFS did not “facially 
discriminate against out-of-state commerce” but calling on the lower court 
to determine if LCFS discriminated in purpose or effect against out-of-
state commerce. On remand the court granted defendants motion for 
summary judgment stating that LCFS in fact facially discriminated. 
 
 473.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 474.  Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978). 
 475.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
SHURTZ(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  10:31 AM 
 
126 
Many law reviews have been written on this topic, so it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to delve deeply into this issue.476 However, both 
Washington and Oregon governors are contemplating executive orders to 
implement a LCFS in their respective states.477 Thus, if constitutional 
issues do impose obstacles, then state and city initiatives must be designed 
to alleviate those issues. 
As for the issue of whether the EPA Clean Air Act (CAA) preempts 
state cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals, consensus of commentator 
is that it does not.478  The EPA recently took steps to encourage states to 
use cap-and-trade programs and in its regulations encouraged additional 
linkage opportunities.479  Furthermore, EPA officials reported in the New 
York Times that states could comply with the act by “enacting state-level 
carbon tax on carbon pollution.”480  Thus, experts conclude: “EPA’s proposed 
regulations pursuant to section 111d of the CAA recognize the legitimacy 
of regional cap-and-trade programs and Congress is unlikely to develop a 
comprehensive cap-and-trade law, state-administered cap-and-trade programs 
linked with foreign governments do not conflict with the federal foreign 
affairs power.”481 
B.  Design Issues 
In addition to making the carbon and cap-and-trade systems consistent 
with interstate commerce and international trade rules, the cap-and-trade 
and carbon tax systems themselves must be designed to be effective with 
broad coverage, reasonable allocation of permits, tight caps or rates (with 
 
 476.  See, e.g., Kathryn Abbott, The Dormant Commerce Clause and California’s 
Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 179 (2013); Ross Astoria, The 
Export Clause and the Constitutionality of a National Cap and Trade CO2 Mitigation 
Policy, 26 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2014). 
 477.  Stegman, supra note 402, at 235. 
 478.  Chandiok, supra note 273, at 278; Karen Edson, California Independent System 
Operator, Presentation at the Seventh Annual San Diego Climate and Energy Law Symposium 
(Nov. 6, 2015); Amy Stein, University of Florida Levin College of Law, Presentation at 
the Seventh Annual San Diego Climate and Energy Law Symposium (Nov. 6, 2015); Kevin 
Poloncarz, Paul Hastings LLP, Presentation at the Seventh Annual San Diego Climate and 
Energy Law Symposium (Nov. 6, 2015). 
 479.  Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,832 (Envtl. Prot. Agency June 18, 2014) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. 60.5700), at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-06-18/pdf/ 
2014-13726.pdf. 
 480.  Davenport, supra note 226; see also Samuel D. Eisenberg et al., A State Tax 
Approach to Regulating Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act, THE BROOKINGS INST. 
(May 22, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/05/22-state-tax-regulating- 
greenhouse-gas-clean-air-act-morris. 
 481.  Stegman, supra note 402, at 238. 
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incremental phase-ins), and limited exemptions.482  These systems must 
also be coordinated with other exiting tax and fee structures within the 
jurisdiction. In addition, any cap-and-trade regime should be coordinated 
with any carbon tax within that same region. Lastly, if a cap-and-trade 
system within one jurisdiction is to be linked to another cap-and-trade system 
in another jurisdiction, then their design must be effectively integrated. 
1.  Coordination Issues 
Any carbon tax or cap-and-trade fee must be coordinated with each 
other and with other existing taxes and fees within the city, state or region.  
Most jurisdictions have sales, consumption or VAT taxes, pollution taxes, 
or gas and motor fuel fees.  Often these overlapping taxes are common 
and acceptable.483 But to reduce any negative effects on the economy and 
the competitiveness of the industry groups in the region, all taxing and fee 
systems must be analyzed to assess the risks from this harmful double 
taxation on business.484 Exemptions and reduced rates may be one way to 
handle this issue. For example, the Scandinavian countries that are part of 
the EU illustrate this approach through exemptions, discounts and phase-
in rules.485  Some countries, like Finland, just exempt all electricity covered 
by EU ETS, while other countries, like Sweden and Denmark have limited 
exemptions, discounts and phase-ins. 
Any adverse impact on the consumer from these double taxes and fees 
should also be assessed.  When low-income taxpayers are faced with unfair 
burdens because of the inelasticity of the energy source, the government 
needs to be creative and come up with other mechanisms or programs to 
solve these issues.  For example, the CA Cap-and-Trade system is a fee 
where all the funds have to go into a green fund.  In order to make the 
overall system fair to low-income taxpayers, the state required the utility 
companies to give rebates.486 Also much of the money is to go into alternative 
transportation systems that could benefit the low-income citizen. 
 
 482.  See CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 222; see Shurtz, supra note 10. 
 483.  See Duff, supra note 9 (discussing automotive fuel taxes, motor vehicle taxes, 
etc., as well as fertilizer taxes and sulfur taxes). 
 484.  See Deng, supra note 167, at 670 (“Above all, the integration of a carbon tax 
into the current tax system will achieve self-consistency and double dividend effects.  In 
other words, the seamless implementation of a carbon tax into the current tax system is as 
important as devising a good tax plan.”). 
 485.  See sources cited supra notes 94–137. 
 486.  See discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
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For the same reasons, it makes sense to coordinate a carbon tax and cap-
and-trade system in the same region.  A cap-in-trade in one region could 
also be coordinated with a carbon tax in another jurisdiction. Some have 
stated that linking these systems “would be relatively easy, as the price in 
each is explicit.”487  For example, a business in a carbon tax country could 
purchase a permit in the country with a cap-and trade, and then remit it in 
lieu of making a tax payment in their country.  Conversely, a business in 
a cap-and-trade could remit carbon tax payments to its government in 
excess of its emissions and receive emissions-tax-payment credits for the 
excess tax payment which could be sold to firms in the country with a cap-
and-trade and which that country could use in place of permits. 
2.  Linkage Issues 
As we mentioned earlier California and Québec have effectively linked 
their cap-and trade system.  Both systems accept allowances from either 
regime to cover the businesses’ emissions.488  EU has bilaterally linked with 
New Zealand and with Australia and uses Kyoto credits interchangeably.  
Canada and the United States, and other countries that did not sign on to the 
Kyoto Protocol, “are not able to offer participants the option of submitting 
Kyoto units in place of domestic allocation.”489 
Allocation differences can cause competitive disadvantages if they have 
two different allocation methods.  If one system auctions the majority of 
allowances, like the RGGI, and the other, like the EU EST, gives them out 
free, then the cost to the participant in the RGGI would be higher and would 
hurt their business as the consumer would have to pay a higher price for 
their product. Although these systems do not compete, this illustrates the 
potential problem of linkage of two systems in one region.  Similar competitive 
problems arise when the two systems do not cover the same sectors.  
Again, the sector covered by the tax or cap-and-trade would have a higher 
cost and be more expensive to its consumers, causing them to shift to the 
lower priced competitor.  A similar inequity might occur if the systems 
have different monitoring or enforcement mechanisms.  In addition, a system 
with lower caps will result in a participant benefiting from having more 
allowances to cover their emissions that will give them a competitive 
advantage. 
 
 487.  See WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 93. 
 488.  Id. 
 489.  O’Connell, supra note 162, at 367–68. 
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3.  Coordination with Other Policies 
To become effective in significant GHG emissions, not only cap-and-trade 
and carbon taxes need to be passed, but other policies must be adopted.490 
Sweden and Denmark illustrate this comprehensive approach as these 
countries uses carbon taxes, in addition to gas taxes and other fees and taxes. 
For example, Sweden has a fertilizer tax and Denmark has a sulfur tax.  These 
countries also use tax incentives and other green environmental initiatives.  
In North America, such a comprehensive approach is needed.491 
C.  Political/Ethical Hurdles 
In order for effective community and local tax initiatives to occur and 
succeed, several things need to happen.  First, the citizens must be connected 
to their community and its needs.  Second, local government must be willing 
to rid itself of its economic growth mindset—giving tax incentives for 
negative economic behavior.  Third, an integrated plan must be developed, 
implemented, and monitored.  Environmental taxes combined with cap-
and-trade and other nontax policies provide the best approach, as illustrated 
by the Western North America initiatives. 
We in North America have an ethical responsibility to act.  First, we are 
not immune from the effects of global warming. Those in the western U.S. 
have experienced droughts.  Those in the south and east have experienced 
severe storms.  Rising sea levels will impact Florida, New York City, and 
many other coastal communities. In the U.S. millions of people depend on 
winter snowfall to fill rivers and supply water.492  Hopefully, our concern 
 
 490.  See WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 93–94. 
 491.  California has passed Senate Bill 375, “which requires the state’s Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations to include as part of their long-range transportation plans a ‘sustainable 
community’s strategy’ that is designed to meet greenhouse gas reduction targets set by the 
state Air Resources Board.” Keith Bartholomew, Cities and Accessibility: The Potential 
for Carbon Reductions and the Need for National Leadership, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 159, 
209 (2009) (citing 2008 Cal. Adv. Leg. Serv. 728). 
 492.  Paul Kitagaki Jr., As snowpack deepens, drought concern lingers, ORANGE 
CNTY. REGISTER (Jan. 25, 2016 1:59 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/snowpack-
701151-water-california.html; see Anthony Watts, Drought buster? Up to 10 Feet of Snow 
this Week for California’s Sierra Nevada, WATTS UP WITH THAT? (Jan. 4, 2016), 
https://wattsupwiththat.com/2016/01/04/drought-buster-up-to-10-feet-of-snow-this-week-for- 
californias-sierra-nevada/; see also Dennis Dimick, Lack Of Snow Leaves California’s 
‘Water Tower’ Running Low, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 24, 2015, 11:48 PM), http:// 
news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/03/150304-snow-snowpack-california-drought- 
groundwater-crisis/. 
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of the impact of global warming on future generations will push us into a 
leadership role. 
Second, the U.S. and Canada have been (and still are) some of the biggest 
consumers of carbon.493  The U.S. is the second largest contributor to climate 
change.494 Thus, based on this past and present usage in North America, 
we have the ethical duty to act.  If all the states and provinces in North 
America signed on to a regional cap-and-trade and carbon tax program, they 
could together, reduce global emissions by one-third.495 
Third, Canada and the U.S. are going to be two of the biggest beneficiaries 
of the melting ice at the North Pole. The five nations with Arctic frontage 
—Canada, Denmark, Norway Russia and the United States—will be the 
winners.496  In addition, many businesses will reap huge profits from this 
tragedy.497  Many of these companies are from the U.S. and Canada.498 
The countries that will be hit the hardest from global warming are mostly 
tropical and poor.  For example, Bangladesh is second on the Climate Change 
Vulnerability Index,499 yet the average person there emits 0.3 tons of carbon 
a year.  This is one seventieth of the average American rate.500  Other losers 
include the Maldives, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Seychelles, Bahamas and the 
Carteret.501  Cities, such as “Manila, Alexandria, Lagos, Karachi, Kolkata, 
Jakarta, Dakar, Rio, Miami, and Ho Chi Minh City, are probably doomed.”502 
According to estimates, by “2050, a billion people would be pushed from 
their homes by global warming.”503  Already, large segments of these societies 
are struggling to relocate.  Under New Zealand immigration quotas, “[s]eventy-
five Tuvaluans and seventy-five Kiribatians” are able to relocate each 
year.504  The “first five of seventeen hundred Carteret Islanders moved to 
newly purchased land in Bougainville.505 Ironically, these countries were 
the least responsible for the consumption of the fuels that produced the 
 
 493.  See Johannes Friedrich et al., Top 10 Greenhouse Gas Emitters: Find Out Which 
Countries Are Most Responsible for Climate Change, EcoWatch (June 24, 2015, 10:42 
AM), http://ecowatch.com/2015/06/24/greenhouse-gas-climate-change/. 
 494.  Id.  China is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases.  Id. 
 495.  Stegman, supra note 402, at 243. 
 496.  See FUNK, supra note 9. 
 497.  Id. at 4. 
 498.  See id. at 9. 
 499.  Id. at 205. 
 500.  Id. at 199. 
 501.  Id. at 64. 
 502.  Id. 
 503.  Id. at 65. 
 504.  Id. 
 505.  Id. at 65. 
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emissions that caused the global warming.506 And they will be the least 
able to afford the technology to adapt to it. 
Climate change is most likely to be “different for those who can afford 
to adapt.”507 The rich countries will be able to afford “the desalination plants, 
the seawalls,” artificial islands floating beaches, etc.508 These countries, 
their companies, and wealthy citizens will most likely be the beneficiaries 
of technology advancement.  The wealthy will “be the first to afford them, 
those who are emitting the most carbon, who are taking care of themselves 
before turning to the developing world.”509  Even geoengineering can result 
in winners and losers and that technology in the hands of the richer nations.510  
“A blueprint for disaster in any society is when the elite are capable  of 
insulating themselves.”511 
Policies that have been proven to be effective in one community should 
be just as effective in another community on the other side of the country 
or world.  While these goals might present tall orders for many localities 
around the world, North American initiatives demonstrate that with a little 
creativity and innovation, sustainable and effective environmental policies 
can be created.  It may be difficult to translate what has happened in developed 
North America to rural areas and to the undeveloped world.  It may be even 
harder to translate these local policies into effective federal or international 
policies.512  Without action at the U.S. federal level, however, local jurisdictions 
may not be able to effectively impact agricultural policies, forestry policies, 
 
 506.  Frontline states, such as Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece are policing the border 
of all of Europe—people from Africa and Syria, etc.  Id. at 173. 
 507.  Id. at 223. 
 508.  Id. at 10. 
 509.  Id. at 82. 
 510.  Id. at 279–80. 
 511.  Id. at 188. 
 512.  One way that local governments can advocate for change outside their jurisdictional 
boundaries, however, is through their purchasing power in the international community.  
Take for example, San Francisco and the passage of Ordinance 88-04 that prohibits the 
use of rainforest lumber in new city projects. Tropical Hardwood and Virgin Redwood 
Ban, S.F. ENVTL. CODE, ch. 8 (2001), http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/ 
administrative/administrativecode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:sanfran
cisco_ca$sync=1.  By passing ordinances such as 88-04, cities can reduce the degradation 
of rainforests thousands of miles away.  However, that does not mean that local governments 
cannot work with countries that supply lumber from rainforests.  Local governments can 
push foreign countries to replant the forests that they clear-cut and engage in sustainable 
forestry processes.  Local governments can do so by pledging to buy sustainable lumber 
or other sustainably harvested goods in exchange for a pledge that the country follows 
sustainable environmental practices. 
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natural resource extraction and other issues outside their boundaries.513 
Therefore, for large-scale issues to be addressed, the U.S. federal government 
is the only entity with jurisdiction to make a positive change.514 Thus, the 
federal government should play a larger role in engaging local policymakers 
to foster local climate change efforts.515 Perhaps these North American 
initiatives can send a clear and consistent message to the federal government 
and to other countries of the world. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has compared carbon taxes with cap-and-trade and highlighted 
the successes of these programs in Western North America.  It has advocated 
a comprehensive climate change plan to regionally link all cap-and-trade 
systems while passing local carbon taxes. Although programs at the state, 
local, and regional levels are critical for providing creative solutions to 
the climate change crisis, what is needed is a binding U.S. federal and 
international response. Nonetheless, local governments should continue 
to pass innovative market initiatives, combining both a cap-and-trade with 
a carbon tax, along with other environmental policies to help stop widespread 
and potentially disastrous climate change. 
  
 
 513.  Id. 
 514.  One promising development is the carbon tariffs proposed against the exports 
of countries that refuse to join the international efforts to limit COS emissions. See Paul 
Krugman, Opinion, China, Coal, Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/11/14/opinion/paul-krugman-china-coal-climate.html (“Such tariffs probably wouldn’t 
even require any change in existing trade law, and they would provide a powerful incentive 
for handouts to get with the program.”). 
 515.  See Thomas M. Gremillion, Setting The Foundation: Climate Change Adaptation 
At the Local Level, 41 ENVTL. L. 1221, 1251–53 (2011). One way the federal government 
could be effective at promoting more local climate change tax policies is by creating a 
national adaptation fund.  Id. at 1252. A national adaptation fund could award grants for 
local projects to better integrate transportation, land use and natural resource planning. Id. 
Additionally, such a fund could help local governments phase-out antiquated travel demand 
models and make realistic assessments of how planned development will affect the local 
water supply and air shed as the climate changes.  Id.  National adaptation funds could help 
in areas where there is local opposition, such as revising zoning codes to relax requirements 
such as parking setbacks. Id. at 1252–53. Such reforms are often difficult for local policymakers 
to undertake because of local opposition. Id. at 1253. The enticement of federal funding 
could matter here and perhaps the prospect of creating jobs could also win support from 
local partners. Id. By creating a national adaptation fund, the federal government could 
finally make a meaningful contribution to the omnipresent need to halt climate change.  Id. 
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independent cuts in 
income taxes 
NETHERLANDS517  1990 
~$20/metric 
















SWEDEN519  1991 
$168/metric 





DENMARK520  1992 
$31/metric ton 
CO2  
$905 million environmental 
subsidies and 









reductions in other 
taxes 
FRANCE522  2014 
$10/metric ton 






reductions in other 
taxes 
 
 516.  WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 2. 
 517.  JENNY SUMMER ET AL., Nat’l Renewable Energy Laboratory, CARBON TAXES: A 
REVIEW OF EXPERIENCE AND POLICY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS, at v (2009), http://www.nrel.gov/ 
docs/fy10osti/47312.pdf. 
 518.  Annegrete Bruvollo & Bodil Larsen, Greenhouse gas emissions in Norway: Do 
carbon taxes work?, STATISTICS NOR., RESEARCH DEP’T (Dec. 2002), http://www.ssb.no/ 
a/publikasjoner/pdf/DP/dp337.pdf. 
 519.  WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 3; see also Energy Policies of IEA Countries: 
Sweden, 2008 Review, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2008), http://www.iea.org/publications/free 
publications/publication/Sweden2008.pdf. 
 520.  WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 2. 
 521.  Id. at 4. 
 522.  Id. at 2. 
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$448 million  
(400 million  
euros) 
reduction on taxes 
ICELAND524  2010 $10/metric ton 
of CO2 
 paid to treasury  







PORTUGAL526  2014 $5/metric of 
CO2 
$178 million tax reductions in 
sustainable policies 







 reduce national 
welfare 
JAPAN528  2012 $3.7/metric 
ton of CO2 












 523.  Finance Act 2010, (S.I. No. 115/2011) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatute 
book.ie/eli/2010/act/5/enacted/en/html; see also Carbon Pricing as of 2014, SIGHTLINE 
INST. (Nov. 17, 2014), http://sightline.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ 
global-carbon-programs-map-still-111714.png. 
 524.  WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 2. 
 525.  Id. at 3–4; see also Neil Maclucas, Swiss Voters Reject Initiative to Replace 
VAT System With Carbon Tax, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/swiss- 
voters-reject-initiative-to-replace-vat-system-with-carbon-tax-1425822327. 
 526.  WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 3; see also Portugal sees Crisis as Opportunity 
for Green Tax Reform, WWF.GR (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.wwf.gr/crisis-watch/crisis-
watch/economy-development/11-economy-development/portugal-sees-crisis-as-opportunity- 
for-green-tax-reform. 
 527.  WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 3; South Africa Gears Up for Carbon Tax, 
PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Aug. 16, 2010), http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90855/7106312. 
html; see also Theresa Alton et al., Introducing Carbon Taxes In South Africa 116 APPLIED 
ENERGY 344, 348 (2014), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ 
S0306261913009288; How Will the Draft Carbon Tax Bill Affect You?, THE CARBON 
REPORT, http://www.thecarbonreport.co.za/the-proposed-south-african-carbon-tax/ (last 
visited May 10, 2016). 
 528.  WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 2–3; MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT JAPAN, 
DETAILS ON THE CARBON TAX 2, https://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/tax/env-tax/20121001a_dct. 
pdf (last visited May 10, 2016). 
 529.  Peter Hannam, Carbon price helped curb emissions, ANU study finds, GUARDIAN 
(July 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com.au/story/2423463/carbon-price-helped-curb-
emissions-anu-study-finds/?cs=8. 
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 530. Id. 
 531. Id. 
 532. Id.  
 533. Id.; see also Carbon Tax Proposal a Non-starter in Alberta, CBCNEWS (Jan. 8, 
2008, 10:41 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/carbon-tax-proposal-a-non-
starter-in-alberta-1.722194. This is not a true carbon tax but rather a performance regulation on 
businesses. See Mark Jaccard, Alberta’s (Non)-Carbon Tax and Our Threatened Climate, 
SUSTAINABILITY SUSPICIONS (Apr. 26, 2013),  http://markjaccard.blogspot.com/2013/04/ 
albertas-non-carbon-tax-and-our.html. Alberta has a true carbon tax proposed to start in 
2017. See Jodie Sinnema, New Alberta Climate-change Plan Includes Carbon Tax For 
Individual Albertans, Cap on Oils and Emissions, EDMONTON J. (Nov. 23, 2015), http:// 
edmontonjournal.com/news/local-news/new-alberta-climate-change-plan-includes-carbon- 
tax-for-individual-albertans-cap-on-oilsands-emissions. 
 534. Adverse Economic Impacts of a Carbon Tax in Maryland, NAT’L ASS’N OF MFRS., 
http://www.nam.org/Issues/Tax-and-Budget/Carbon-Tax/State-Sheets/Maryland/ (last visited 
May 10, 2016); see also Sonal Patel, Gas Taxes: Carbon Taxes Around the World, POWER 
(Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.powermag.com/gas-taxes-carbon-taxes-around-the-world/? 
printmode=1.  
 535. Our Policy, CARBON WASH., http://yeson732.org/plain-language/ (last visited May 
10, 2016) (“This tax swap will take place over two years, with the sales tax reduction divided 
in two (a half-percentage-point reduction in each year) and the carbon tax phasing in from 














BOULDER, CO530  2007 $7/metric ton 
CO2 
$1 million climate 
mitigation 
programs 




































WASHINGTON535  proposed $15/metric ton 
of CO2 
expected 
$1.7 billion  
offset state 
sales tax and 






at 3.5% plus inflation (up to a maximum of $100 in 2016 dollars) in order to maintain 
revenue neutrality.”).  
 536.  See discussion supra Part III.B.3.; see also States, CARBON TAX CENTER, http:// 
www.carbontax.org/states/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2016). 
 537.  Carbon Tax Bill Introduced into Assembly, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 28, 2015, 2:51 
PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/carbon-tax-bill-introduced-into-assembly- 
300134771.html.  
 538. Craig Rubens, Bay Area’s Carbon Tax, the Nation’s First, Rankles Big Oil, 
GIGAOM (May 22, 2008. 11:00 AM), https://gigaom.com/2008/05/22/bay-area-leads-with-
nations-first-carbon-tax/.  
 539.  Kristin Eberhard, All the World’s Carbon Pricing Systems in One Animated 
Map, SIGHTLINE INST. (Nov. 17, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.sightline.org/2014/11/17/ 
all-the-worlds-carbon-pricing-systems-in-one-animated-map/.  
 540. Kate Galbraith, Climate Change Concerns Push Chile to Forefront of Carbon Tax 
Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/business/ 
international/climate-change-concerns-push-chile-to-forefront-of-carbon-tax-movement. 
html?_r=0; see also Sao Paulo, Chile Becomes the First South American Country to Tax 
Carbon, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/carbon-chile-
tax-idUKL6N0RR4V720140927.  
 541.  Eberhard, supra note 539; see also SECRETARIA DE MEDIO AMBIENTE Y 











2.2 billion each 
year 
NEW YORK537  Proposed $40/metric ton 
of CO2 
 60% goes to 
low income 
households, the 




the transition to 
clean energy in 
the State 
SAN FRANCISCO, 
CA (BAAQMD)538  
2008 $0.045/metric 







COSTA RICA539  1997 $1-14/metric 
ton of CO2 
$15 million climate 
mitigation 
programs 





MEXICO541  2014 $3/metric ton 
of CO2 
$1 billion  
SHURTZ(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/2016  10:31 AM 
[VOL. 7:  61, 2015–16]  Carbon Pricing Initiatives 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 137 
APPENDIX B 
CHART 3: ESTIMATED EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS IN EASTERN 





























1990 emissions were expected to be 
reduced by 1.7 to 2.7 million 
metric tons CO2 annually in 2000. 
In covered sectors, emissions were 





1991 emissions increased by 32% from 




2010 emissions have dropped 15% since 
2008 
8 Iceland549  2005 increased 17% since 2005 
9 Switzerland550  2008 emissions have decreased 5% since 
2008 
10 France551  2005 emissions decrease 13% since 2005 
11 Japan552  2012 emissions increase 16% since 1990 
 
 
 542.  Rayne, supra note 106.  
 543.  Id. 
 544.  Id. 
 545.  Id. 
 546.  Sumner et al., supra note 103, at 9. 
 547.  Rayne, supra note 106.  
 548.  CARBON TAX CTR., supra note 536. 
 549.  Rayne, supra note 106. 
 550.  Id. 
 551.  Id. 
 552.  Mari Iwata, Japan CO2 Emissions Worst on Record, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 
2014, 5:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2014/11/17/japan-co2-emissions-worst- 
on-record/. 
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CHART 4: ESTIMATED EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN 






CHANGE IN CO2 EMISSIONS 
1 British Columbia553  2008 GHG emissions were expected to be 
reduced emissions by up to 3 million 
metric tons CO2 annually in 2020 
due to the tax 
2 San Francisco, CA554  2008 by 2010, the program reduced 
emissions by 12% below 1990 levels 
3 Boulder, CO555  
 
2007 emissions in 2007 and 2008 
decreased from 2006 levels. Greatest 
reductions due to programs funded 
but the carbon tax: 1)Renewables 
energy activities (60,000 metric tons 
of CO2), 2)Transportation (33,000 
metric tons CO2), and 3)Energy 
efficiency (6,700 metric tons CO2) 
4 Québec556  2007 emissions were expected to be 
reduced by 11.2 million metric tons 
CO2 by 2012 due to the carbon tax 
6 Chile557  
 
2018 predicts to reduce its emissions 20% 
by 2020 below 2007 levels this 
includes reduction by increase in 
renewable energy 
7 Oregon558  
 
2016 reduce emissions by 12-13% below 
baseline projections 
8 Mexico559  
 
2012 emissions decreased 0.08% since 
2008 
9 Costa Rica560  
 




 553.  Sumner et al., supra note 103, at 20. 
 554.  THE GLOBAL COMPACT CITIES PROGRAMME, supra note 455. 
 555.  Sumner et al., supra note 103, at 20. 
 556.  Id. 
 557.  Galbraith, supra note 540.  
 558.  Liu & Renfro, supra note 140. 
 559.  CO2 Emissions (Metric tons per Capita)-Mexico, WORLD BANK, http://data. 
worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC/countries/MX-XJ-XT?display=graph. 
 560.  Rayne, supra note 106. 
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CHART 5: MAJOR TAXED SECTIONS IN EXISTING AND PROPOSED 




























































































































            
NATURAL 
GAS 
X X X X X X X X  X X X 
GASOLINE X  X X X X X X X X X X 
COAL X   X X X X X  X X X 
ELECTRICITY X X   X X       








  X X  X  X X   X 
HOME 
HEATING OIL 
X X  X   X X X   X 
SOLID FUEL      X  X     
* Light only. 
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CHART 6: MAJOR TAXED SECTIONS IN EXISTING AND PROPOSED 
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